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ABSTRACT 
One of the most complex and highly debated problems in the context of 
corporate liability for complicity in human rights violations is how to distinguish 
lawful commercial activities from those that give rise to corporate complicity liability.  
In many cases in which corporations are accused of aiding and abetting human rights 
violations, the act of assistance consists of what would usually be regarded as an 
ordinary and perfectly acceptable business activity, such as providing financing to a 
government or supplying it with goods or infrastructure.  Merely doing business with 
a bad actor is not sufficient to impose liability on corporations for that actor’s human 
rights violations, but no clear criteria on what transforms legitimate business 
transactions into reprehensible acts of complicity exist. 
This Article approaches the question of determining the relevant liability 
standards by providing an in-depth analysis of jurisprudence stemming from three 
different contexts:  Alien Tort Statute (ATS) cases on corporate complicity; ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals on the closely related question of dual-purpose act 
liability (where the assistance provided could be used for both lawful and unlawful 
activities); and U.S. criminal cases where the act of assistance consisted of a 
commercial activity.  Jurisprudence stemming from these three different contexts has 
in common that many courts feel that the generally applicable standards for 
determining complicity liability need to be adapted and restricted where assistance 
consists of a commercially motivated or a dual-purpose act.  This is largely achieved 
by requiring either that the assistance reach a certain significance threshold 
(limitations at the actus reus level of liability), or that the mental state with which it 
was carried out made the assistance particularly reprehensible (limitations at the 
mens rea level of liability). 
In the particular context of corporate complicity liability in human rights 
violations, academic debate of liability standards largely focuses on whether the 
relevant mens rea standard should be one of purpose or one of knowledge.  While 
clearly important, this Article goes beyond this question and argues that the mens 
rea standard cannot be understood and determined in isolation.  Without taking a 
holistic look at all elements of liability and their interaction, it is not possible to 
sufficiently understand the concerns that triggered adoption of a purpose standard of 
mens rea, the legitimacy of these concerns, and alternative ways of addressing them. 
The purpose of this Article is not to present detailed liability criteria that will 
work equally in all contexts.  Rather, it serves the more modest aim of analyzing and 
drawing conclusions from the implications of different approaches to determining 
the necessary actus reus and mens rea elements of corporate complicity liability, 
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while recognizing that the details need to be developed with reference to the specific 
contexts in which the question of corporate complicity liability arises. 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate complicity in human rights violations has received a lot of attention 
in recent years.1  Complicity means that the corporation does not itself commit 
human rights violations, but rather assists others in carrying them out.2  It thus relates 
to the situation of indirect corporate involvement in human rights abuses and 
frequently arises in the context of business transactions with “bad actors,” often 
states, which commit gross human rights violations.3  Assistance can take many 
different forms and can range from acts that only marginally impact the act carried 
out by the principal to those without which the principal offense would not be 
possible. 
One of the most complex and highly debated problems in this context is how to 
distinguish lawful commercial activities from those that give rise to corporate 
complicity liability.  In many cases in which corporations are accused of aiding and 
abetting human rights violations, the act of assistance consists of what would usually 
be regarded as an ordinary and perfectly acceptable business activity, such as 
providing financing to a government or supplying it with goods or infrastructure.4  
This raises the question of what transforms legitimate business transactions with 
governments (or in some instances other actors, such as armed groups) into 
reprehensible acts of complicity. 
It is instantly obvious that the problem is not mainly legal in nature.  Rather, 
how the law responds depends decisively on highly political and ideologically-fraught 
questions, such as whether and to what extent it is legitimate to pursue business 
interests, even if this has an adverse human rights impact.  There might also be 
perfectly legitimate reasons for supplying governments, even those with the worst 
human rights records, with certain goods and services, such as to enable them to 
carry out governmental tasks that clearly benefit the population, like building 
schools.  Are corporations, and should they be, responsible for how their business 
partners use their goods and services?  If so, under what circumstances, and on what 
grounds? 
More clarity on how to distinguish complicity from legitimate business 
transactions is of the utmost importance for various reasons.  Corporations need to 
 
 1.   See generally Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Clarifying the Concepts of “Sphere of 
Influence” and “Complicity”, Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/16 (May 15, 2008) (by John Ruggie) 
[hereinafter Ruggie, Clarifying the Concepts]; Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework, principle 17 & cmt., Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) 
(by John Ruggie) [hereinafter Ruggie, Guiding Principles]; 3 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, CORPORATE 
COMPLICITY & LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY (2008). 
 2.   Ruggie, Clarifying the Concepts, supra note 1, para. 29–30. 
 3.   See 3 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 1, at 28 (noting that allegations of complicity might 
arise when companies transact business with bad actors who commit human rights violations). 
 4.   Id. at 28–29. 
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be given clear guidance on their responsibilities, not just to avoid criminal and civil 
complicity claims, but also to be in compliance with human rights standards in highly 
significant soft law instruments, such as the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, which include a responsibility to avoid complicity in human rights 
violations.5  Courts need to have a good understanding of the policy implications of 
the choice and application of liability standards in this context, which is more and 
more important given that civil or criminal litigation against corporations is 
increasingly initiated in different states.6  States need to know where their 
responsibilities lie when regulating corporate behavior and providing remedies for 
potential corporate abuse.  And victims need to know under what circumstances they 
might have claims for damages against corporations that were complicit in the human 
rights violations they suffered. 
At the judicial level, this problem has to date most explicitly, extensively, and 
influentially been addressed under the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act (Alien Tort 
Statute, or ATS)7 which for many years has been the most significant vehicle 
worldwide to address corporate complicity through litigation.8  Despite the uncertain 
future of corporate complicity litigation under the ATS since the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in Kiobel,9 an analysis of cases decided in this context remains 
 
 5.   Ruggie, Guiding Principles, supra note 1, principle 17 & cmt.  For a critical discussion see 
generally Sabine Michalowski, Due Diligence and Complicity:  A Relationship in Need of Clarification, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS: BEYOND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT? 
218 (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2013) [hereinafter Michalowski, Due Diligence]. 
 6.   For Canada see, e.g., Anvil Mining, Ltd. v. Association canadienne contre l’impunité, 2012 
QCCA 117 (Can. Que. C.A.) (deciding case concerning human rights abuses in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo).  For the United Kingdom, see, e.g., Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals PLC, [2010] EWHC 
(QB) 3228 (deciding suit regarding conduct in Peru); see also Charis Kamphuis, Foreign Investment and 
the Privatization of Coercion: A Case Study of the Forza Security Company in Peru, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
529, 542–48 (2012) (discussing the Guerrero case).  For the Netherlands, see, e.g., Hof ’s-Gravenhage 9 mei 
2007, NJFS 2007, 183 m.nt (van Anraat) (Neth.) (deciding case concerning conduct of Dutch citizen in 
Iraq); see also Wim Huisman & Elies van Sliedregt, Rogue Traders: Dutch Businessmen, International 
Crimes and Corporate Complicity, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 803, 807–10 (2010) (discussing cases involving 
conduct abroad tried by Dutch courts). 
 7.   The Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States,” has been one of the main legal tools used to try to hold corporations to 
account for their complicity in violations of the law of nations.  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); see generally, e.g., 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009) (applying the ATS in 
an action against a Canadian corporation for complicity liability); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank, Ltd., 
504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (overturning the district court’s dismissal of the claim under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding a violation under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act). 
 8.   3 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 1, at 54; see Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Liability for 
Extraterritorial Torts under the Alien Tort Statute and Beyond:  An Economic Analysis, 100 GEO. L.J. 2161, 
2162 (2012) (“Recent years have witnessed an enormous increase in litigation against corporate 
defendants under the Alien Tort Statute.”). 
 9.   Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1665 (2013) (holding that the presumption 
against the extraterritorial application of U.S. legislation applies to the ATS.)  This has serious 
repercussions because in many of the cases filed under the ATS all relevant acts of assistance were 
committed abroad.  Many courts have rejected ATS-based claims against corporations after Kiobel 
because of these extra-territoriality concerns.  See generally Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580 (9th Cir. 
2014); Baloco v. Drummond, 767 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2014); Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 
F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014); Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2014); 
Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013); Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, No. 09–cv–1237, 
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important, and not only because corporate complicity cases continue to be brought 
under the ATS.  More importantly, these cases constitute the most detailed 
engagement of a judiciary with the question of how to distinguish lawfully doing 
business with a bad actor from commercial activities that trigger complicity liability 
for human rights violations committed by a business partner.10  Furthermore, this 
jurisprudence has highly influenced global attempts to conceptualize corporate 
liability.11  The importance of understanding the relevant policy considerations 
identified by these courts, and their implications for defining legal principles and 
standards in this context, thus transcend ATS litigation and U.S. courtrooms.  Part I 
of this Article will therefore provide a detailed analysis of selected ATS cases and 
assess different approaches to liability standards based on the policy considerations 
these approaches reflect. 
While only ATS cases have expressly dealt with the question of corporate 
complicity in human rights violations, courts in other contexts had to deal with 
comparable issues.  The ad hoc international criminal tribunals, for example, on 
whose analysis of liability standards for aiding and abetting liability ATS 
jurisprudence heavily relies, have recently struggled to apply these principles to so-
called dual-purpose assistance cases, i.e., cases in which the accomplice provided 
“general assistance which could be used for both lawful and unlawful activities.”12  
These have many similarities with the typical scenario in corporate complicity cases.  
Where, for example, military vehicles are sold to a regime that, to the seller’s 
knowledge, uses such vehicles both for lawful and unlawful purposes, it is not clear 
what link between the sale and the unlawful use would be necessary to justify 
complicity liability of the seller.  Part II of this Article demonstrates that the 
approaches developed by the ad hoc tribunals to resolve this question, based largely 
on policy considerations on how to establish a sufficient link between the act of 
assistance and the violation carried out by the principal, provide an interesting basis 
for reflection on liability standards for corporate complicity in human rights 
violations.  The same is true for U.S. domestic criminal complicity cases where the 
act of assistance consists of a commercial act, and some of these cases and the policy 
discussions that informed the courts’ approaches to defining liability standards in this 
context will therefore be discussed in Part III. 
 
2013 WL 4511354 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2013); Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 961 F. 
Supp. 2d 185 (D.D.C. 2013); Hua Chen v. Honghui Shi, No. 09 Civ. 8920(RJS), 2013 WL 3963735 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2013).  Others courts have found that the facts sufficiently touched and concerned the 
U.S. to rebut the presumption against extra-territoriality.  See generally Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 
F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2014); Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014); Krishanti v. 
Rajaratnam, No. 2:09–cv–05395, 2014 WL 1669873 (D. N.J. Apr. 28, 2014); Du Daobin v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 2 
F. Supp. 3d 717 (D. Md. 2014); Ahmed v. Magan, No. 2:10–cv–00342, 2013 WL 4479077 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 
20, 2013); Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304 (D. Mass. 2013); Mwani v. Laden, 947 
F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).  For interesting analyses of Kiobel see generally Sarah H. Cleveland, After 
Kiobel, 12 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 551 (2014); Louise Weinberg, What We Don’t Talk About When We Talk 
About Extraterritoriality:  Kiobel and the Conflict of Laws, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1471 (2014). 
 10.   See Ruggie, Clarifying the Concepts, supra note 1, para. 29 (stating that the more than forty cases 
brought under the ATS constitute the “largest body of domestic jurisprudence regarding corporate 
responsibility for violations of international law”). 
 11.   3 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 1, at 6; Ruggie, Clarifying the Concepts, supra note 1, 
para. 29. 
 12.   Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Appeals Judgement, para. 44 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). 
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Jurisprudence stemming from these three different contexts has in common that 
all courts feel the need to limit liability for acts of assistance that consist of an 
ordinary commercial transaction, or a dual-purpose act, by requiring either that the 
assistance reach a certain significance threshold (limitations at the actus reus level of 
liability), or that the mental state with which it was carried out make the assistance 
particularly reprehensible (limitations at the mens rea level of liability).  In the 
particular context of corporate complicity liability in human rights violations, 
academic debate of liability standards largely focuses on whether the relevant mens 
rea standard should be one of purpose or one of knowledge.13  While clearly 
important, this Article goes beyond this question and argues that the mens rea 
standard cannot be understood and determined in isolation.  Without taking a look 
at all elements of liability and their interaction, it is not possible to sufficiently 
understand the concerns that led to stricter limitations of complicity liability through 
adopting a purpose standard of mens rea, or to appreciate fully the implications of 
this approach.  In light of a holistic discussion of the interplay of the various elements 
of complicity liability, this Article will show that the fear that without a mens rea 
standard of purpose, corporate complicity liability might be limitless is unjustified, 
and that better alternatives to restricting liability exist. 
When referring to complicity, this Article understands it to be synonymous with 
aiding and abetting, the main form of participation in which the central question of 
this Article arises, namely whether and under what circumstances ordinary 
commercial activities can give rise to liability for human rights violations committed 
by third parties.  To talk about corporate complicity in general terms might seem to 
imply that this is a uniform concept.  This, however, is not the case, and context is 
crucial when refining the criteria to be applied in any given scenario.  Legal 
complicity liability might require stricter limitations and allow for less flexibility than 
liability under soft law instruments.  Criminal liability partly serves different 
functions, and has different consequences, from civil complicity liability,14 which 
might need to be reflected in the nuances of the criteria to be applied.  The legal 
context of the jurisdiction in which liability is established is also of crucial 
importance.  It will also make a difference whether liability is determined 
retrospectively, in order to give rise to compensation or punishment, or looked at 
prospectively in order to fulfill due diligence responsibilities. 
 
 13.   See generally Shriram Bhashyam, Knowledge or Purpose?  The Khulumani Litigation and the 
Standard for Aiding and Abetting Liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 245 
(2008); Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations:  Confusion in the Courts, 
6 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 304 (2008); Bryan Cox, Comment, Confused Intent: A Critique of the Fourth 
Circuit’s Adoption of a Purpose Mens Rea Standard for Aiding and Abetting Liability under the Alien Tort 
Statute [Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388 (4th  Cir. 2011)], 51 WASHBURN L.J. 705 (2012); Sabine 
Michalowski, The Mens Rea Standard for Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability – Conclusions from 
International Criminal Law, 18 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 237 (2014) [hereinafter Michalowski, 
The Mens Rea Standard]; David Scheffer & Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The 
Resiliency of Corporate Liability under the Alien Tort Statute and the Case for a Counterattack Strategy in 
Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 334 (2011); Angela Walker, The Hidden Flaw in Kiobel: 
Under the Alien Tort Statute the Mens Rea Standard for Corporate Aiding and Abetting is Knowledge, 10 
NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 119 (2011). 
 14.   See Nathan Isaac Combs, Note, Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability, 58 VAND. L. REV. 241, 250–
53 (2005) (discussing different purposes of criminal and tort law); James G. Stewart, A Pragmatic Critique 
of Corporate Criminal Theory: Lessons from the Extremity, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 261, 281–89 (2013) 
(discussing the practical distinction between corporate civil and criminal liability). 
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In light of these considerations, the purpose of the discussion that follows is not 
and cannot be to present detailed liability criteria that will work equally in all 
contexts.  Rather, it will serve the more modest aim of analyzing and drawing 
conclusions from the implications of different approaches to determining the 
necessary actus reus and mens rea elements of corporate complicity liability, while 
recognizing that the details need to be developed with reference to the specific 
context in which the question of corporate complicity liability arises.  Nevertheless, 
while the exact legal definitions of complicity as well as the applicable liability 
standards differ from State to State, this Article will show that the broad policy 
considerations that influence how to address the issue are not specific to any 
particular jurisdiction or context.  Indeed, the international nature of the problem is 
reflected in the many efforts at the international level to define corporate complicity 
and to develop standards for corporate human rights responsibilities.15 
I. THE U.S. COURTS’ APPROACH TO CORPORATE COMPLICITY 
LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
Given that complicity liability requires both an actus reus and a mens rea,16 
liability criteria need to define both the relevant act of assistance and the necessary 
mental element.  At the objective level, the liability standard determines what effect 
the corporate activity must have on the commission of the offense, including how 
close the causal link between the act of assistance and the offense committed by the 
principal needs to be, to justify the imposition of secondary liability on the 
corporation.  Thus, the actus reus standard defines whether, for example, in a given 
case the sale of military vehicles to a regime that uses them to carry out extrajudicial 
killings qualifies as an act of aiding and abetting this violation.  The mens rea 
standard defines the state of mind with which the corporation must have provided 
the assistance in order to incur liability.  In the example of the sale of military 
vehicles, the question asked at this level would be whether liability requires that the 
corporation acted with knowledge that the sale would further these violations, with 
the desire of facilitating them, or with some other mental state.  These two 
components of aiding and abetting liability thus restrict the liability of the accomplice 
in different ways. 
As the relevant liability standards provide the tool for determining whether an 
act is lawful or gives rise to complicity liability, their definition raises important 
policy issues regarding the limits of lawful commercial activities and the scope of 
corporate complicity liability. 
 
 15.   See generally, e.g., 3 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 1; Global Compact Principle Two, 
UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT (last updated Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ 
AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html; Ruggie, Clarifying the Concepts, supra note 1. 
 16.   Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Appeals Judgment, paras. 346–47 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 26, 2013). 
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A. Restricting Corporate Complicity Liability at the Actus Reus Level 
The standard actus reus test in U.S. ATS aiding-and-abetting cases, drawn from 
international criminal law,17 is that of practical assistance, encouragement, or moral 
support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.18  Thus, not 
every act of assistance is sufficient to form the actus reus of aiding and abetting.  
Rather, the act must have an effect on the commission of the principal offense, and a 
substantial effect at that.  Assistance having a substantial effect “need not constitute 
an indispensable element, that is, a conditio sine qua non for the acts of the 
principal.”19  “An accessory may be found liable even if the crimes could have been 
carried out through different means or with the assistance of another.”20 
How to apply this test in corporate complicity cases and decide under what 
circumstances commercial acts have a substantial effect on the commission of human 
rights violations by third parties is a difficult task which only very few courts in ATS 
cases have taken up, an exception being the district court decision in In re South 
African Apartheid Litigation.21  The case arose from claims by South African victims’ 
groups against several multinational corporations, including banks, automobile 
manufacturers, and information technology firms,22 for aiding and abetting crimes 
committed by the South African apartheid regime.23  When the case reached the 
district court for the second time in 2009, the court discussed in detail how to 
determine whether an act had a substantial effect on the commission of gross human 
rights violations.  The court started its analysis of this issue by suggesting that: 
It is (or should be) undisputed that simply doing business with a state or 
individual who violates the law of nations is insufficient to create liability 
under customary international law.  International law does not impose 
liability for declining to boycott a pariah state or to shun a war criminal.  
 
 17.   See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, para. 235 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) (finding that actus reus requires “practical assistance, 
encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime”); 
Prosecutor v. Du[ko] Tadi (Prosecutor v. Tadić), Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgement, para. 688 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997) (requiring the act to have a substantial effect on 
the illegal act); Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Appeal Judgement, paras. 127, 134 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 9, 2007) (observing that substantial effect is a “fact-
based inquiry”); United States v. von Weizsaecker (The Ministries Case), 14 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 
478 (1950) (“The question is whether they knew of the program and whether in any substantial manner 
they aided, abetted, or implemented it.”). 
 18.   In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2011); Presbyterian Church 
of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 258 (2d Cir. 2009); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank, 
Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 277 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., dissenting); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 951 
(9th Cir. 2002). 
 19.   Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, para. 209. 
 20.   In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); accord Tadić, Case 
No. IT-94-1-T, para. 688. 
 21.   In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 257.  The last surviving claims in this case 
were recently dismissed in light of the Supreme Court decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013), and its application to the apartheid litigation case by the Second Circuit in 
Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013).  In re S. African Apartheid Litig., No. 02 MDL 
1499(SAS), 2014 WL 4290444 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2014). 
 22.   In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 542–43 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 23.   Id. at 544–45. 
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Aiding a criminal “is not the same thing as aiding and abetting [his or her] 
alleged human rights abuses.”24 
Thus, the provision of goods or services to a State that commits gross human 
rights violations, or any other commercial dealings with such a State, do not in and of 
themselves give rise to complicity liability.25  Some commentators,26 as well as some of 
the judges hearing the case at an earlier stage,27 suggested that the claims in In re 
South African Apartheid Litigation deserved to be dismissed on the basis that the 
complaints asserted no more than that the defendants had engaged in commerce with 
the apartheid regime.  The District Court, on the other hand, understood the 
plaintiffs’ allegations as arguing that the defendant corporations’ activities had a 
substantial effect on the crimes carried out by the apartheid regime.28  The court 
stressed that where this can be demonstrated, liability does not follow from merely 
doing business with the regime, or from aiding and abetting the regime as such, but 
rather from the fact that the corporation aided and abetted the violations committed 
by the regime.29 
This conclusion made it necessary to engage with the question of how to 
determine whether a commercial activity has a substantial effect on gross human 
rights violations.  The court sought recourse in Nuremberg case law to answer this 
question,30 even though the ‘substantial effect’ formula was not used by Nuremberg 
tribunals but was rather developed many years later by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.31  In the Ministries Case,32 the Nuremberg 
Tribunal acquitted Karl Rasche, a member of the board of managers of Dresdner 
Bank during the Nazi period, because: 
A bank sells money or credit in the same manner as the merchandiser of 
any other commodity. . . .  Loans or sale of commodities to be used in an 
unlawful enterprise may well be condemned from a moral standpoint and 
 
 24.   In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 257 (citing Mastafa v. Australian Wheat Bd., 
No. 07 Civ. 7955(GEL), 2008 WL 4378443 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2008)). 
 25.   Id. 
 26.   Michael D. Ramsey, International Law Limits on Investor Liability in Human Rights Litigation, 
50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 280 (2009) (observing that some of the claims seemed to rest on “little more than 
allegations that the defendants’ operations aided the South African economy”). 
 27.   In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d at 551; see also Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l 
Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 293–94 (2d Cir. 2007) (Korman, J., dissenting in part) (“Thus, car companies are 
accused of selling cars, computer companies are accused of selling computers, banks are accused of 
lending money, oil companies are accused of selling oil, and pharmaceutical companies are accused of 
selling drugs.”). 
 28.   See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 257–59 (discussing the application of the 
“substantial assistance” standard in the context of commerce with human rights violators). 
 29.   Id.; see also Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 289 (Hall, J., concurring) (arguing for extending liability in 
“cases in which a defendant played a knowing and substantial role in the violation of a clearly recognized 
international law norm”). 
 30.   In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 258. 
 31.   See Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, paras. 245, 249 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) (applying the “substantial effect” test by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)). 
 32.   United States v. von Weizsaecker (“The Ministries Case”), 14 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 308 
(1950). 
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reflect no credit on the part of the lender or seller in either case, but the 
transaction can hardly be said to be a crime.33 
In the Zyklon B Case, on the other hand, Bruno Tesch, whose factory had 
manufactured and sold the lethal gas that was used in Nazi concentration camps, was 
found guilty of aiding and abetting crimes against humanity for supplying the gas 
used to execute allied nationals.34  For the court in In re South African Apartheid 
Litigation, the different outcomes in the two cases rest on: 
[T]he quality of the assistance provided to the primary violator.  Money is 
a fungible resource, as are building materials.  However, poison gas is a 
killing agent, the means by which a violation of the law of nations was 
committed.  The provision of goods specifically designed to kill, to inflict 
pain, or to cause other injuries resulting from violations of customary 
international law bear a closer causal connection to the principal crime 
than the sale of raw materials or the provision of loans.35 
This led the court to the conclusion that, in the context of the provision of 
commercial goods or services, it is sufficient, but also necessary, that the aider and 
abettor provide the means by which a violation of the law is carried out.36 
Based on this definition, the court found the actus reus of aiding and abetting 
the crime of apartheid to be established regarding the allegation that “IBM and 
Fujitsu supplied computer equipment designed to track and monitor civilians with 
the purpose of enforcing the racist, oppressive laws of apartheid” as well as the 
software and hardware to run the system “used to track racial classification and 
movement for security purposes.”37  These acts were essential for “implementing and 
enforcing the racial pass laws and other structural underpinnings of the apartheid 
system”38 and constituted “the means by which the South African Government 
carried out both racial segregation and discrimination.”39 
However, the court rejected the idea that “the mere sale of computers to the 
Department of Prisons—despite the widely held knowledge that political prisoners 
were routinely held and tortured without trial— . . . constitute[d] substantial 
assistance to that torture.”40  Equally, with regard to the allegation that IBM had 
supplied computers to armaments manufacturers that were crucial to the South 
African Defense Forces, the court suggested that “the sale of equipment used to 
enhance the logistics capabilities of an arms manufacturer is not the same thing as 
selling arms used to carry out extrajudicial killing; it is merely doing business with a 
bad actor.”41 
 
 33.   Id. at 622. 
 34.   The Zyklon B Case, 1 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93, 101–02 (1947). 
 35.   In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 258. 
 36.   See id. at 258–59 (premising liability on the provision of the means by which a crime is committed, 
which is sufficient to meet the actus reus requirement). 
 37.   Id. at 268 (internal quotations omitted). 
 38.   Id. 
 39.   Id. 
 40.   Id. 
 41.   In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 268–69. 
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When analyzing the claims against the automotive defendants, the court was 
satisfied that the sale of “heavy trucks, armored personnel carriers, and other 
specialized vehicles to the South African Defense Forces and . . . the South African 
police unit charged with investigating anti-apartheid groups”42 was sufficient to 
establish the actus reus of aiding and abetting extrajudicial killings.43  This was 
because “[t]hese vehicles were the means by which security forces carried out attacks 
on protesting civilians and other antiapartheid activists; thus by providing such 
vehicles to the South African Government, the automotive companies substantially 
assisted extrajudicial killing.”44  However, allegations that Ford and General Motors 
sold cars and trucks to the South African police and military forces, and continued to 
do so after export restrictions were imposed, were insufficient to support a claim 
because the particular vehicles “without military customization or similar features 
that link[ed] them to an illegal use” and were “simply too similar to ordinary vehicle 
sales.”45 
It becomes clear that the court’s approach to the actus reus was motivated by a 
wish to limit complicity liability for ordinary sales and the provision of ordinary 
commercial services.  The question of the substantial effect of the act of assistance on 
the commission of the violations was approached by focusing on the inherent quality 
of the products and on whether they provided the direct means for the relevant 
violations.  Where this was not the case, the court refrained from any analysis of the 
use the regime would make of the goods, and of the effect of the sale on the 
violations.  As, for example, computers and computer programs were not the direct 
means of committing torture, no further analysis of the link between the technology 
and the violations to assess whether its provision had a substantial effect on their 
commission was carried out.46  Consequently, in practice, the conclusion that “[t]he 
provision of goods specifically designed to kill, to inflict pain, or to cause other 
injuries resulting from violations of customary international law bear a closer causal 
connection to the principal crime than the sale of raw materials or the provision of 
loans,”47 did not give rise to a heightened analysis of potential causal links in the 
latter case (e.g., the sale of computers), as the statement might suggest.  Rather, the 
court seems to automatically reject the existence of a causal link in these cases, while 
automatically assuming such a link in the former scenario (e.g., the sale of poison 
gas).48 
The court accordingly excluded as too remote from the commission of the 
principal offense the provision of goods that are inherently neutral, and which 
cannot, by their very nature, be the instrument with which violations are carried out.  
In such cases, no mens rea analysis is necessary as liability already fails at the actus 
reus/causation stage.  On the other hand, supplying goods that are specifically 
 
 42.   Id. at 264. 
 43.   Id. 
 44.   Id. 
 45.   Id. at 267 (“The sale of cars and trucks without military customization or similar features that link 
them to an illegal use does not meet the actus reus requirement of aiding and abetting a violation of the 
law of nations.”). 
 46.   Id. at 269. 
 47.   In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d  at 258. 
 48.   See id. at 258–59 (discussing relevance of type of goods provided to whether the actus reus 
requirement is satisfied). 
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designed for harmful purposes or that provide the direct means for carrying out gross 
human rights violations does amount to the actus reus required for complicity 
liability.  In those cases, complicity liability can only be avoided if the defendants 
acted without the necessary mens rea. 
As a mens rea analysis then only becomes necessary where the goods or 
services provided by the defendant corporation are inherently harmful or specifically 
designed to assist with the realization of harmful purposes, the mens rea test does not 
limit liability for neutral or harmless goods or services that were put to detrimental 
use, but rather restricts liability for the provision of inherently harmful goods or the 
direct means with which gross human rights violations were committed.  The fact that 
liability is severely restricted at the actus reus level might explain why the court had 
no problems with adopting a mens rea test of knowledge.  The court declared that 
“[o]ne who substantially assists a violator of the law of nations is equally liable if he 
or she desires the crime to occur or if he or she knows it will occur and simply does 
not care.”49  The restrictions placed on the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability 
are thus counterbalanced by the wide reach of a mens rea standard of knowledge 
once the actus reus is made out and the corporate activities at issue are shown to go 
beyond ordinary commercial sales or other ordinary commercial services.50 
B. Restricting Corporate Complicity Liability at the Mens Rea Level 
Many courts that have had to decide corporate complicity cases under the ATS 
have largely bypassed the actus reus analysis and instead focused their efforts on the 
mens rea assessment.  Regarding the necessary mens rea, the ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals whose jurisprudence is influential on the approach to liability 
standards under the ATS apply a knowledge standard;51 i.e., they require knowledge 
that these acts assist the commission of the offense.  However, the accomplice need 
not share the principal’s wrongful intent.52  Until October 2009, in line with the 
jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals, most U.S. courts adopted a 
mens rea standard of knowledge that the act of the corporation would assist in the 
commission of the offense.53  This changed with the decision in Presbyterian Church 
of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.,54 in which the Second Circuit decided that liability 
for aiding and abetting gross human rights violations under the ATS required that 
the corporation act with the primary purpose of facilitating the violations, a decision 
 
 49.   Id. at 262. 
 50.   It is worth noting, though, that since the 2009 district court decision in In re South African 
Apartheid Litigation, the Second Circuit has adopted a mens rea standard of purpose, which is therefore 
now the applicable standard for future decisions.  Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 
582 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 51.   Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, para. 245 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Appeals Judgement, 
para. 102 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 25, 2004); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. 
IT-95-14/1-A, Judgement, paras. 162–63 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000); 
Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Appeals Judgement, para. 48 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). 
 52.   Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, para. 245. 
 53.   Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 950–51 (9th Cir. 2002); Cabello v. Fernández-Larios, 402 
F.3d 1148, 1157–58 (11th Cir. 2005); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 54 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005); Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 290–91 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 54.   Talisman, 582 F.3d at 258–59. 
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL  Volume 50, Issue 3 
2015] DOING BUSINESS WITH BAD ACTORS 415 
 
which has since been followed by some federal courts of appeals,55 while others have 
confirmed adherence to the knowledge standard.56 
Even though corporate actors might sometimes knowingly accept that their 
activities will likely contribute to gross human rights violations that are being carried 
out, particularly when working in States with poor human rights records, or in the 
middle of armed conflicts, corporations will only very rarely act with the purpose of 
facilitating them.57  Rather, corporate activities will usually primarily be driven by 
business interests.58  As a consequence, if corporate responsibility for complicity in 
gross human rights violations required that the corporation act with the primary 
purpose of facilitating violations, they would hardly ever be subject to such liability, 
whereas a mens rea standard of secondary purpose or of knowledge would widen the 
range of scenarios in which corporations might face complicity charges.59  The mens 
rea test to be applied is thus an important, if not in many cases the determinative, 
factor for defining the scope of corporate complicity liability, as the application of a 
purpose test will in most cases simply rule out such liability. 
The next Part will introduce the reasons behind the switch to a mens rea 
standard of purpose in corporate complicity cases decided under the ATS, using 
some recent key cases as examples. 
1. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc. 
In Talisman, the plaintiffs alleged that in the course of its oil extraction project 
in an area of Sudan that was afflicted by a civil war, the defendant built all-weather 
roads that linked the concession area to military bases.60  These roads facilitated the 
oil extraction, but also military activities.61  The plaintiffs alleged that the roads 
allowed the military to launch attacks year-round in areas often previously 
 
 55.   Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 400–01 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 56.   Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d 11, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  In Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, the Ninth 
Circuit left open which of the conflicting views on the prevalent mens rea standard under international 
criminal law it found more convincing, as the court regarded the purpose standard to be met in the case 
before it.  671 F.3d 736, 765 (9th Cir. 2011) (Schroeder, J., plurality opinion), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 
(2013). 
 57.   Cf. Christoph Burchard, Ancillary and Neutral Business Contributions to ‘Corporate–Political 
Core Crime’: Initial Enquiries Concerning the Rome Statute, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 919, 939 (2010) 
(assuming that “core criminal policies” are not the primary motivation of business actors); Hans Vest, 
Business Leaders and the Modes of Individual Criminal Responsibility under International Law, 8 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 851, 862–63 (2010) [hereinafter Vest, Business Leaders] (remarking that with this standard 
“there seems to be no other alternative than to dismiss most cases involving business leaders, as they will 
act primarily, or at least simultaneously, for economic purposes”). 
 58.   Cf. Burchard, supra note 57, at 939 (assuming that, in the context of international criminal law, 
business leaders are frequently influenced by “motives and interests that are incongruent with core 
criminal policies”); Vest, Business Leaders, supra note 57, at 855–59. 
 59.   See, e.g., Burchard, supra note 57, at 939 (discussing the scope of corporate liability in light of a 
corporation’s purpose and knowledge with regard to an act); Vest, Business Leaders, supra note 57, at 
862–63 (“At least with respect to business leaders who provide the essential means for the commission of 
war crimes . . . it would hardly seem understandable if ‘for the purpose’ was not read expansively.”). 
 60.   Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 249 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 61.   Id. 
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inaccessible due to seasonal flooding.62  The defendants also upgraded two airstrips in 
the concessions.63  This served the purpose of enhancing the safety and convenience 
of the defendant’s personnel, but at the same time supported military activity, as the 
government used the airstrips to refuel military aircraft, supply troops, take 
defensive action, and initiate attacks, including regular bombing runs.64  Security 
arrangements made for oil company personnel in coordination with the government 
and military forces resulted, according to the plaintiffs, “in the persecution of 
civilians living in or near the oil concession areas.”65 
The court highlighted early on that none of the acts the defendant corporation 
was accused of were “inherently criminal or wrongful.”66  Moreover, “‘[t]he activities 
which the plaintiffs identify as assisting the Government in committing crimes 
against humanity and war crimes generally accompany any natural resource 
development business or the creation of any industry.’”67  Thus, the court regarded 
this as a case of routine business transactions that were facially lawful.  Indeed, the 
Second Circuit accepted the District Court’s assessment in the same case that: 
[T]he plaintiffs’ theories of substantial assistance serve essentially as 
proxies for their contention that Talisman should not have made any 
investment in the Sudan, knowing as it did that the Government was 
engaged in the forced eviction of non-Muslim Africans from lands that 
held promise for the discovery of oil.68 
In light of such a perception of the complaint, it comes as no surprise that the 
court looked for ways to reject it.  It did so based on a rewriting of the relevant mens 
rea standard.  The court deviated from the vast majority of previous decisions that 
applied a mens rea standard of knowledge and instead adhered to Judge Katzmann’s 
analysis in Khulumani,69 according to which Nuremberg case law and the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court demonstrate that the relevant standard 
for aiding and abetting a violation of international law is that of purpose.70  Its 
rejection of the claim then relied on this, it is submitted, mistaken71 interpretation of 
international precedent.72 
 
 62.   Id. 
 63.   Id. 
 64.   Id. at 249–50. 
 65.   Id. at 249. 
 66.   Talisman, 582 F.3d at 261. 
 67.   Id. at 260–61 (quoting the findings of the district court in the same case). 
 68.   Id. at 261 (alteration in original) (quoting the district court’s opinion). 
 69.   Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 276–79 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., 
concurring); accord id. at 332–33 (Korman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).  Judge Hall, on the 
other hand, pronounced himself in favor of a standard of knowledge in that case, though based on the 
view that the relevant mens rea standard has to be derived from U.S. federal law.  Id. at 287–89.  Even 
though two judges thus agreed on a mens rea standard of purpose, Judge Korman did so in his partial 
dissent, stating that had he reached the issue, he would have supported Judge Katzmann’s view with 
regard to the applicable mens rea test.  As a consequence of this split in opinion, the court in Talisman did 
not regard Judge Katzmann’s view to set a binding precedent and therefore addressed the question afresh.  
Talisman, 582 F.3d at 258. 
 70.   Talisman, 582 F.3d at 258–59. 
 71.   For a critical discussion of the Talisman court’s understanding of international precedent see 
generally Michalowski, The Mens Rea Standard, supra note 13. 
 72.   See Talisman, 582 F.3d at 259, 263, 268 (applying purported mens rea standard of purpose in 
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When considering the corporation’s liability with regard to building the all-
weather roads and airstrips, the court acknowledged the defendant’s awareness of 
the use made of these facilities by the Sudanese military.73  Under the knowledge 
standard of mens rea that was prevalent in U.S. case law on aiding and abetting 
liability under the ATS prior to Talisman,74 this might have been sufficient to 
establish the necessary mens rea of aiding and abetting liability.  However, under the 
newly introduced mens rea standard of purpose, awareness was not decisive and the 
court found it necessary to undertake an analysis of the purpose with which the 
activities of the corporation had been carried out.75  It attached significance to the 
fact that all-weather roads and airstrips were necessary for developing an oil-
extraction project in a remote location.76  This meant that there were, therefore, 
“benign and constructive purposes for these projects, and (more to the point) there 
[was] no evidence that any of this was done for an improper purpose.”77  The court 
further clarified that: 
Even if Talisman built roads or improved the airstrips with the intention 
that the military would also be accommodated, GNPOC had a legitimate 
need to rely on the military for defense.  It is undisputed that oil workers 
in that tumultuous region were subjected to attacks: rebel groups viewed 
oil installations and oil workers as enemy targets; . . . rebels launched a 
nighttime mortar attack against a Heglig camp where 700 oil workers were 
living; and in Block 5A the attacks caused that concessionaire (Lundin Oil 
AB) to close down operations for an extended period.  In these 
circumstances, evidence that GNPOC was coordinating with the military 
supports no inference of a purpose to aid atrocities.78 
Thus, given the mens rea requirement of purpose, to knowingly assist gross 
human rights violations carried out by a government would not result in corporate 
liability as long as the corporation was not motivated by an improper desire to bring 
about these violations but rather acted in pursuit of a legitimate purpose or interest, 
such as the defense of its activities against rebel attacks, or more generally the desire 
to guarantee the smooth and safe running of its business operations.  Indeed, the 
court understood the mens rea test of purpose as requiring that the act of assistance 
be directly motivated by the wish to bring about atrocities and that this, moreover, 
constitute the primary reason for the act.79  Purpose thus seems to be synonymous 
with motive. 
The plaintiffs had deduced the corporation’s awareness of the effect of its acts 
of assistance on the gross human rights violations carried out by Sudanese forces 
 
dismissing plaintiffs’ claim). 
 73.   Id. at 262. 
 74.   See, e.g., Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d 11, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (applying a knowledge 
standard for mens rea for the ATS under customary international law). 
 75.   Talisman, 582 F.3d at 263–64. 
 76.   Id. 
 77.   Id. at 262. 
 78.   Id. 
 79.   See id. at 263 (stating that the defendants must act with the purpose to assist the international law 
violations). 
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from the fact that senior Talisman officials had protested against the government’s 
use of their infrastructure, and from their possession of security reports that 
expressed concern about the use of airstrips by the military.80  However, the court 
held not only that knowledge was insufficient to establish the mens rea but that this 
“evidence of knowledge (and protest) cuts against Talisman’s liability.”81  This was 
because such a protest indicated the corporation’s opposition to the violations and 
therefore negated any inference of a desire to facilitate them.82  The court concluded 
that: 
There is evidence that southern Sudanese were subjected to attacks by the 
Government, that those attacks facilitated the oil enterprise, and that the 
Government’s stream of oil revenue enhanced the military capabilities 
used to persecute its enemies.  But if ATS liability could be established by 
knowledge of those abuses coupled only with such commercial activities as 
resource development, the statute would act as a vehicle for private parties 
to impose embargos or international sanctions through civil actions in 
United States courts.  Such measures are not the province of private 
parties but are, instead, properly reserved to governments and 
multinational organizations.83 
This is in line with Judge Sprizzo’s view in In re South African Apartheid 
Litigation, which regarded it to be relevant in the context of considering corporate 
liability that the U.S. government, “consistent with most other world powers, 
supported and encouraged business investment in apartheid South Africa” and opted 
for a policy of constructive engagement, relying on “the tool of economic investment 
as a means to achieve greater respect for human rights and a reduction in poverty in 
developing countries.”84  He moreover pointed out that: 
In a world where many countries may fall considerably short of ideal 
economic, political, and social conditions, this Court must be extremely 
cautious in permitting suits here based upon a corporation’s doing business 
in countries with less than stellar human rights records, especially since the 
consequences of such an approach could have significant, if not disastrous, 
effects on international commerce.85 
While Judge Sprizzo relied on these considerations to reject corporate aiding 
and abetting liability altogether, the court in Talisman used them to justify the need 
for a restrictive mens rea test of purpose as the only way to effectively limit liability.  
Without a thorough actus reus assessment, it is not clear whether the court thought 
that most routine business transactions, including the ones at issue in the Talisman 
case, could potentially amount to relevant acts of aiding and abetting human rights 
violations, or if the imposition of liability was only justified where, in addition to 
assistance that has a substantial effect on human rights violations, the corporation 
 
 80.   Id. at 262. 
 81.   Talisman, 582 F.3d at 262 
 82.   See id. (discussing the significance of Talisman’s knowledge). 
 83.   Id. at 264. 
 84.   In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 85.   Id. 
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acted with more than knowledge.  An alternative interpretation might be that the 
court, while doubting that in such cases even the actus reus requirement would be 
satisfied, adopted the view that it was easier and more effective to restrict liability at 
the mens rea level, thereby bypassing all discussions of the potential effect of 
commercial activities on human rights violations that would otherwise be necessary.  
Indeed, the court’s actus reus analysis is largely inconclusive.  On the one hand, the 
Second Circuit seems to approve of the district court’s negative view that there was 
not even a relevant act of substantial assistance.86  At the same time, it accepts that 
Talisman’s various activities that were at issue in this case had assisted the 
government,87 without, however, undertaking any analysis as to whether these acts 
would amount to practical assistance that had a substantial effect. 
Whatever the court’s views on whether the actus reus requirement was met in 
this case, the decision in Talisman clearly rests decisively on the court’s assessment of 
the corporation’s mens rea.  The court’s approach demonstrates its view that even 
acts that have a substantial effect on violations of human rights carried out by others 
should be shielded from complicity liability unless the corporation had the desire to 
facilitate these, rather than simply knowingly accepting their occurrence as a side 
effect of pursuing their business interests. 
2. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (concurring opinion) 
The Talisman ruling was cited with approval by Judge Leval in his concurring 
opinion in Kiobel.88  The main importance of the Second Circuit decision in Kiobel 
clearly lies in the majority holding that international law does not recognize civil 
liability of corporations for aiding and abetting violations of the law of nations, and 
that therefore claims based on corporate complicity cannot succeed under the ATS.89  
However, Judge Leval’s concurring opinion, while of crucial importance regarding its 
meticulous rejection of the majority’s approach to rejecting corporate liability under 
international law, at the same time demonstrates that even if such liability were 
accepted, a mens rea standard of purpose would shield corporations from liability in 
a great number of scenarios. 
In Kiobel, the defendant corporations had for several decades been engaged in 
oil exploration and production in the Ogoni region of Nigeria.90  According to the 
plaintiffs, in response to protests by groups of local citizens against adverse effects of 
the oil operations, the defendant resorted to the Nigerian government to suppress 
the Ogoni resistance.91  The most important allegations were that: 
Throughout 1993 and 1994, Nigerian military forces . . . shot and killed 
Ogoni residents and attacked Ogoni villages—beating, raping, and 
arresting residents and destroying or looting property—with the assistance 
 
 86.   Talisman, 582 F.3d at 262. 
 87.   Id. 
 88.   Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 154 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
 89.   Id. at 148–49 (majority opinion). 
 90.   Id. at 123. 
 91.   Id. 
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of defendants.  Specifically, plaintiffs allege that defendants, inter alia, (1) 
provided transportation to Nigerian forces, (2) allowed their property to 
be utilized as a staging ground for attacks, (3) provided food for soldiers 
involved in the attacks, and (4) provided compensation to those soldiers.92 
The majority in Kiobel did not proceed to an analysis of the facts of the case, as 
it negated any basis for corporate aiding and abetting liability under the ATS.93  
Judge Leval, however, who disagreed on that fundamental point, had to analyze 
whether the plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to make out a case of aiding and 
abetting liability.94  Following precedent in Talisman, Judge Leval stated that it was 
not enough for the plaintiffs to allege that the defendant corporations had knowingly 
contributed to human rights violations carried out by officials of the Nigerian 
government.95  It rather needed to be shown that they acted “with a purpose of 
bringing about the abuses.”96  According to him, 
the Complaint fails to allege facts . . . showing a purpose to advance or 
facilitate human rights abuses.  The provision of assistance to the Nigerian 
military with knowledge that the Nigerian military would engage in human 
rights abuses does not support an inference of a purpose on Shell’s part to 
advance or facilitate human rights abuses.  An enterprise engaged in 
finance may well provide financing to a government, in order to earn 
profits derived from interest payments, with the knowledge that the 
government’s operations involve infliction of human rights abuses.  
Possession of such knowledge would not support the inference that the 
financier acted with a purpose to advance the human rights abuses.97 
In the scenario painted here, a question might arise with regard to the necessary 
actus reus, as it would require some detailed analysis to show that providing 
financing to a government would have a substantial effect on the human rights 
violations it commits.98  However, Judge Leval skipped this issue completely and 
instead concentrated on the mens rea assessment.  Applying Talisman, he took the 
position that one cannot infer intent to violate human rights from an act of knowing 
participation that is primarily motivated by business reasons.99  As a consequence, as 
long as the principal purpose of a corporation is making profit, and it is indifferent to 
whether gross human rights violations are carried out by the government of the state 
 
 92.   Id. 
 93.   Id. at 140–41. 
 94.   See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 154 (Leval, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing the standard to be 
applied in analyzing whether plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient). 
 95.   Id. (asserting that purpose standard of mens rea liability applied). 
 96.   Id. at 188. 
 97.   Id. at 193. 
 98.   For a detailed discussion see generally Sabine Michalowski, No Complicity Liability for Funding 
Gross Human Rights Violations?, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 451 (2012) [hereinafter Michalowski, No 
Complicity Liability]. 
 99.   See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 158 (Leval, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining how profiting 
through the mere provision of financing or military equipment for an entity accused of violating human 
rights will not support an inference that a corporation “acted with a purpose to promote or advance those 
violations” (emphasis in original)). 
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in which it operates, it can knowingly participate in them without risking complicity 
liability. 
This becomes particularly clear when Judge Leval discusses the allegations that 
“representatives of Shell and its Nigerian subsidiary met in Europe ‘to formulate a 
strategy to suppress MOSOP [Movement for Survival of Ogoni People] and to return 
to Ogoniland.’”100  According to Judge Leval, even “that Shell ‘knew’ the Nigerian 
military would use ‘military violence against Ogoni civilians’ as part of the effort to 
suppress MOSOP . . . does not support an inference that Shell intended for such 
violence to occur.”101  Thus, to enlist the help of the government in the suppression of 
the protests, knowing that this would be implemented, at least partly, through 
measures that involve gross human rights violations would not be sufficient to result 
in liability for aiding and abetting. 
Judge Leval also accepted the argument already advanced in Talisman that it 
was legitimate for “an entity engaged in petroleum exploration and extraction . . . 
[to] provide financing and assistance to the local government in order to obtain 
protection needed for the petroleum operations with knowledge that the government 
acts abusively in providing the protection.”102  He concluded that there were 
insufficient allegations of 
facts which support a plausible assertion that Shell rendered assistance to 
the Nigerian military and police for the purpose of facilitating human 
rights abuses, as opposed to rendering such assistance for the purpose of 
obtaining protection for its petroleum operations with awareness that 
Nigerian forces would act abusively.  In circumstances where an enterprise 
requires protection in order to be able to carry out its operations, its 
provision of assistance to the local government in order to obtain the 
protection, even with knowledge that the local government will go beyond 
provision of legitimate protection and will act abusively, does not without 
more support the inference of a purpose to advance or facilitate the human 
rights abuses and therefore does not justify the imposition of liability for 
aiding and abetting those abuses.103 
The court did not specify what “more” would be necessary to justify the 
inference of a mens rea of purpose.  It becomes clear, though, that purpose is 
understood as primary purpose—that is, a desire that the human rights violations 
should occur—instead of indifference to or acceptance of such violations as a 
consequence of knowing assistance. 
Judge Leval invoked policy considerations in favor of a mens rea standard of 
primary purpose in the context of corporate complicity litigation, his main concern 
being to find an acceptable way to apportion and restrict liability.104  In his view, it is 
the mens rea that limits the extent of corporate liability and delineates the 
boundaries between legitimate business activities and conduct that gives rise to 
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 104.   Id. at 158. 
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corporate liability,105 and only a purpose standard can effectively achieve this aim.  
He invokes two scenarios to show the, in his view undesirable, consequences of 
applying a knowledge standard.  The first is that of “corporations engaged in the 
extraction of precious resources in remote places . . . [which] will contribute money 
and resources to the local government to help it render the protection the 
corporation needs for its operations”106 and that are sued for aiding and abetting if 
the government troops then commit atrocities.  The second case is that of “[t]he 
shoemaker who makes Hitler’s shoes [who] should not be held responsible for 
Hitler’s atrocities, even if the shoemaker knows that a pair of shoes will help Hitler 
accomplish his horrendous agenda.”107  It seems as if for Judge Leval, Hitler’s 
shoemaker is in the same league as “business corporations engaged in finance or in 
the sale of food or military supplies [which] might raise funds for, or sell supplies to, 
a government that is known to violate the law of nations.”108  Both examples refer to 
cases of “profit-motivated provision of finance or supplies, done with awareness of 
the purchasing government’s record of atrocities.”109 
[An] imposition of liability . . . would go too far in impeding legitimate 
business, by making a business corporation responsible for the illegal 
conduct of local government authorities that is beyond the corporation’s 
control, and which the corporation may even deplore. . . .  Concerns of this 
nature might well give pause to a court contemplating the imposition of 
liability on a business corporation for aiding and abetting in a 
government’s infliction of human rights abuses, where the corporation did 
not promote, solicit, or desire the violation of human rights.110 
Judge Leval made these observations in the context of a concurring opinion that 
makes a forceful plea in favor of preserving the possibility of suing corporations 
under the ATS for their complicity in human rights violations.  It would thus be 
possible to interpret his discussion as an attempt to alleviate concerns that the 
existence of such causes of action would lead to limitless corporate liability by 
showing that the purpose test sets clear restrictions on such liability.  Nevertheless, in 
uncritically applying the purpose test to these cases and justifying it based on the 
policy considerations discussed above, his approach, just like that adopted in 
Talisman, suggests that as long as the facilitation of human rights violations is just a 
byproduct of business motivated decisions, it should not result in liability.  He seems 
to regard even their direct furtherance as legitimate as long as the reasons for that 
furtherance are business related, including guaranteeing the safety of business 
operations and personnel.111 
 
 105.   See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 158 (Leval, J., concurring in the judgment) (asserting that the court “will 
not support the imposition of aiding and abetting liability on the corporation for that government’s abuses 
unless the corporation acted with a purpose to promote or advance those violations”). 
 106.   Id. at 157. 
 107.   Id. at 158. 
 108.   Id. at 157. 
 109.   Id. 
 110.   Id. at 158. 
 111.   Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 158 (Leval, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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His observation that liability should not attach for illegal conduct of the 
business partner that is beyond the corporation’s control112 is interesting.  
Unfortunately, it is not further explored, and whether and how the purpose test 
might address this issue therefore is not made clear.  Neither is it evident why 
promoting and soliciting human rights violations is mentioned in the same breath as 
desiring them, as the first two scenarios seem to refer to the actus reus, while the last 
is clearly a mens rea element. 
 
3. Doe v. Nestle 
In Doe v. Nestle, victims of child slavery who were forced to work on cocoa 
plantations in the Ivory Coast brought an aiding and abetting case against 
corporations that control the production of Ivorian cocoa.113  The plaintiffs alleged 
that the “defendants operate in the Ivory Coast ‘with the unilateral goal of finding 
the cheapest sources of cocoa.’”114  According to the plaintiffs, even though they were 
well aware of the child slavery problem in the Ivory Coast (through first-hand 
knowledge acquired during their numerous visits to Ivorian farms, and through the 
reports of domestic and international organizations),115 they “continue[d] to supply 
money, equipment, and training to Ivorian farmers, knowing that these provisions 
[would] facilitate the use of forced child labor.”116  In the United States, the 
defendants also lobbied against efforts to curb the use of child slave labor by 
requiring importers and manufacturers to certify their products as “slave free.”117 
When discussing whether or not these allegations were sufficient to meet the 
mens rea requirement for corporate aiding and abetting under the ATS, the court 
left open whether or not the necessary standard was one of purpose or knowledge, as 
it found that plaintiffs’ factual allegations met the requirements of the purpose test.118  
While the purpose standard would not be “satisfied merely because the defendants 
intended to profit by doing business in the Ivory Coast,”119 an inference of purpose 
could be based on allegations that the corporation did not use their control over the 
Ivory Coast cocoa market to stop “the use of child slave labor by their suppliers.”120  
This, coupled with the cost-cutting benefit they allegedly received from the use of 
child slaves, justified the inference that the defendants acted with purpose.121  The 
defendants’ alleged lobbying efforts against legislative labeling requirements were 
regarded as corroborating the inference that they acted with the purpose of 
facilitating slave labor.122 
 
 112.   Id. 
 113.   Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 114.   Id. at 1017. 
 115.   Id. 
 116.   Id. 
 117.   Id. 
 118.   Id. at 1024. 
 119.   Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1025. 
 120.   Id. 
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The court distinguished this case from Talisman where the defendant did not 
“in any way benefit from the underlying human rights atrocities carried out by the 
Sudanese military, and in fact, those atrocities ran contrary to the defendant’s goals 
in the area, and even forced the defendant to abandon its operations.”123  In Nestle, 
the corporation “profited by doing business with known human rights violators . . . 
[and] sought to accomplish their own goals by supporting violations of international 
law.”124  It did not matter that the plaintiffs in Nestle “conceded that the defendants 
did not have the subjective motive to harm children,” that instead, “the defendants’ 
motive was finding cheap sources of cocoa” and that there was “no allegation that 
the defendants supported child slavery due to an interest in harming children in West 
Africa.”125  Thus, the court concluded that “the defendants sought a legitimate goal, 
profit, through illegitimate means, purposefully supporting child slavery.”126 
4. Sarei v. Rio Tinto 
Sarei v. Rio Tinto is another case where a court left open whether the relevant 
mens rea standard was one of knowledge or of purpose, as it found that the purpose 
standard had been met.127  In that case, the majority opinion suggested that in order 
to satisfy the mens rea standard of purpose it was sufficient to allege that the 
defendant corporation 
issued the PNG government “an ultimatum”: displace the local residents 
interfering with its mining operations, no matter the means, or Rio would 
abandon all investments on PNG.  When the PNG government employed 
military means to fulfill Rio’s demands, Plaintiffs allege, Rio provided the 
PNG military helicopters and vehicles to carry out the operations, even 
after reports of war crimes became public.  When initial efforts were 
insufficient to displace the locals, PNG imposed a blockade on 
Bougainville; Plaintiffs allege that at a meeting “between PNG officials 
and two top Rio executives, one top Rio manager encouraged continuation 
of the blockade to ‘starve the bastards out . . . .’”  Moreover, Rio allegedly 
assured the PNG government that the continued maintenance of the 
blockade was enough to prevent Rio from withdrawing from PNG, while 
Rio simultaneously attempted to repress reporting of the humanitarian 
crisis unfolding on the island.  These allegations support much more than 
“an inference of mere knowledge on Rio Tinto’s part,” it supports an 
inference that Rio Tinto actively encouraged the killing of 
Bougainvilleans.128 
 
 123.   Id. at 1024. 
 124.   Id. 
 125.   Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1025. 
 126.   Id. at 1025–26. 
 127.   See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 765–67 (9th Cir. 2011) (Schroeder, J., plurality 
opinion), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) (“Because plaintiffs allege that Rio Tinto specifically intended to 
harm them in aiding and abetting the commission of war crimes, we need not decide whether the broader 
interpretation of ‘purpose’ [which is inferred from the knowledge of likely consequences] would also 
sustain liability . . . .”). 
 128.   Id. at 766 (citations omitted).  Judge Leval indicated in Kiobel that he would agree to a finding of 
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According to the court, these were sufficient factual allegations to support a 
claim that “Rio Tinto specifically intended to harm the residents of Bougainville.”129  
It seems crucial for a finding of liability under the purpose test that the corporation 
expressly incited the government’s commission of gross human rights violations in 
order to protect its business interests, instead of simply knowing and accepting that 
such violations might occur.  This is so even though encouragement seems to be an 
actus reus rather than a mens rea element of complicity liability. 
5. In re Chiquita Brands 
Another case in which a court found that a corporation had acted with a mens 
rea of purpose is In re Chiquita Brands.130  An action was filed by “family members of 
trade unionists, banana-plantation workers, political organizers, social activists, and 
others tortured and killed by the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), a 
paramilitary organization operating in Colombia,” against Chiquita for aiding and 
abetting the crimes committed by the AUC.131  According to the court and based on 
admissions made by Chiquita itself: 
Chiquita formed an agreement with the AUC, paying them to pacify the 
banana plantations and to suppress union activity.  In return for Chiquita’s 
support, the AUC agreed it would drive the guerrillas out of Chiquita’s 
banana-growing areas and maintain a sufficient presence to prevent the 
guerrillas from returning.  Furthermore, the AUC would provide Chiquita 
with security, labor quiescence, and ensure that the unions were not 
infiltrated by leftists sympathetic to the FARC or ELN guerrillas.  This 
arrangement benefitted Chiquita, as labor unrest and strikes were 
minimized while profits increased.132 
The plaintiffs also alleged that Chiquita assisted the AUC by facilitating arms 
shipments.133 
The court clarified, in line with Talisman, that allegations of mere knowledge 
that the AUC would commit such offenses were insufficient.  Rather, the plaintiffs 
needed to plead that “Chiquita paid the AUC with the specific purpose that the 
AUC commit the international-law offenses alleged in the complaints,” which had to 
allege that “Chiquita intended for the AUC to torture and kill civilians in Colombia’s 
banana-growing regions.”134  The Court found this test to be satisfied, for example, 
with regard to the allegations that: 
Chiquita supported terrorist groups in Colombia by paying them and 
assisting them to obtain arms and smuggle drugs.  Chiquita knew that these 
 
purpose on the basis of such facts.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 158 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(Leval, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 129.   Rio Tinto, 671 F.3d at 766. 
 130.   In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1351–52 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
 131.   Id. at 1305. 
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TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL  Volume 50, Issue 3 
426 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 50:3 
groups used illegal violence against civilians and intended that they employ 
this strategy to quell social and labor unrest in the Northeast Colombian 
region of Uraba and safeguard the stability and profitability of Chiquita’s 
enterprises in Colombia. . . .  Chiquita’s acts of assistance to the AUC were 
made with the intent that the AUC continue carrying out acts of killing, 
torture, and other illegal violence against the civilian population of Uraba 
in accordance with the AUC’s strategy for suppressing the FARC and 
deterring its sympathizers.  In exchange for its financial support to the 
AUC, Chiquita was able to operate in an environment in which labor and 
community opposition was suppressed. . . . Chiquita intended that the 
AUC continue carrying out acts of killing, torture, and other illegal 
violence against the civilian population of Uraba in accordance with the 
AUC’s strategy for suppressing the FARC and deterring its sympathizers.  
In providing the AUC with money and assistance with their arms and drug 
trafficking, Defendants intended that the AUC obtain arms and continue 
their practice of killing civilians, especially those civilians who were 
perceived as threats to the profitability of the banana industry.  The 
leadership of the AUC did, in fact, carry out killings of union members, 
social organizers and other undesirable groups, as well as civilians with no 
known or suspected ties to the guerrillas, knowing that Chiquita expected 
and intended that they do so using the arms and money provided by 
Chiquita.135 
The court even held that the defendants had the necessary mens rea for aiding 
and abetting a war crime, that is “the alleged offenses be carried out in furtherance 
of a conflict [such that] . . . Chiquita shared the principal’s same purpose, i.e., to 
torture and kill as a means to defeat militarily its enemy.”136  In this respect, the court 
stressed that “[t]he fact that Chiquita may not have had a military objective of its 
own, or that it was motivated by financial gain, is not dispositive.  A ‘lack of motive 
does not negate intent to assist the underlying acts that may be war crimes.’”137  
Quoting Drummond II,138 the court opined that if it was required that defendants act 
in direct furtherance of a ‘military objective’ . . . an ATS action would not 
lie where defendants were motivated by ideology or the prospect of 
financial gain, as plaintiffs allege here.  Indeed under defendants’ proposed 
rule, it is arguable that nobody who receives a paycheck would ever be 
liable for war crimes.139 
Applying this reasoning to the case before it, the court then held that: 
The complaints’ allegations that Chiquita assisted the AUC with the intent 
that the AUC’s interests were furthered over the FARCs [sic] in the 
Colombian civil war sufficiently allege the mens rea for aiding and abetting 
 
 135.   Id. at 1345–46. 
 136.   Chiquita Brands Int’l, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 1348. 
 137.   Id. at 1349 (quoting Doe v. Drummond Co. (Drummond II), No. 2:09–CV–01041–RDP, 2010 WL 
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the AUC’s war crimes, irrespective of the fact that the company may have 
chosen the AUC’s side for financial, as opposed to military, reasons.140 
In finding the purpose test to be met even where the corporation was clearly 
primarily motivated by the wish to further its business interests and not by a desire to 
facilitate human rights violations, it seems as though, unlike the court in Talisman, 
the court in Chiquita did not equate purpose with primary purpose and motive.  At 
the same time, it is very likely that the outcome in Chiquita was highly influenced by 
the fact that the acts of assistance were not regarded as legitimate business activities. 
6. Link between the Heightened Mens Rea Standard of Purpose and the 
Commercial Nature of the Act 
In recent years, quite a few courts have moved from a mens rea test of 
knowledge to one of purpose, motivated by the wish to restrict corporate complicity 
liability in the context of commercial activities.  Indeed, when examining how 
purpose was defined in these cases and how its existence or absence was established, 
it becomes clear that the application of the mens rea test was highly influenced by 
how the courts perceived and characterized the activities which provided the actus 
reus of aiding and abetting. 
In Talisman and Kiobel, the activities of the defendant corporations, which 
according to the plaintiffs should be regarded as assisting in gross human rights 
violations, were classified by the courts as ordinary business activities that pursued a 
legitimate purpose.141  To compensate for the facial legitimacy or routine commercial 
nature of the corporate activities at issue, the courts limited liability to acts that were 
carried out with a more culpable state of mind than mere knowledge.  This approach 
is based on the assumption that it is legitimate to pursue business interests even 
where it is clear that the relevant activities substantially assist in human rights 
violations.  Even the direct support of such violations seems to be regarded as 
legitimate as long as the reasons for such behavior are business-related, which 
includes guaranteeing the safety of business operations and personnel.142  Doe v. 
Nestle suggests that an exception to this might be made where the corporation 
directly benefited from the violations.143 
This can be contrasted with In re Chiquita, where the court clearly did not 
regard payment to the AUC, a group classified as a terrorist organization, as either 
an ordinary business practice or as justified in pursuance of legitimate business 
interests.144  Indeed, the court stressed that arms shipments for and payments to the 
AUC were not supplied “for ordinary commercial purposes, but were specifically 
intended to assist the AUC’s military campaign against the FARC.”145  The purpose 
test was found to be met, even though the acts of the defendant corporation were 
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 141.   Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 262 (2d Cir. 2009); Kiobel 
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primarily motivated by its business interests.146  Thus, where the activities go beyond 
the merely commercial or beyond the legitimate protection of a corporation’s 
interests in the context of conducting business, a more relaxed version of purpose is 
instead applied.  The definition of purpose was not confined to primary purpose and 
motive; the fact that the corporation was first and foremost motivated by financial 
interests did not exclude a secondary purpose of facilitating the violations carried out 
by the AUC, and the court was more easily prepared to infer the necessary purpose 
from the knowing actions of the corporation than in Talisman and Kiobel. 
Sarei v. Rio Tinto demonstrates that the line that separates legitimate from 
illegitimate corporate activities is crossed where the corporation expressly demands 
that the government protect its business interests by carrying out gross human rights 
violations.147  Such encouragement is considered to meet the standards of the purpose 
test.148  This suggests a mixing of the actus reus and mens rea requirements, as 
encouragement is a particular form of aiding and abetting, not an element of mens 
rea.149  Nevertheless, in the case of direct encouragement of the commission of human 
rights violations, it might be easier to infer a primary purpose that the corporation 
wants these violations to happen.  This case also shows that the equation of motive 
and purpose can be misleading, as it is not clear that Rio Tinto acted with the 
primary purpose of bringing about human rights violations.150  It is much more 
plausible that the corporation acted with the objective to maximize its profits and 
was prepared to pursue this goal through all necessary measures, including the direct 
encouragement of human rights violations.  Comparing this with the case of Shell in 
Kiobel, where Shell allegedly discussed and supported a strategy to suppress the 
protest movement, knowing that violence would be used,151 in both cases the 
corporation allegedly knew that the protection it wanted to obtain would involve the 
commission of gross human rights violations.  The same can be said for the defendant 
in Talisman.152  The main difference between the cases at the mens rea level seems to 
be that Talisman apparently would have preferred that the protection be provided 
without the human rights violations,153 and that Shell might have hoped that its 
interests could be protected through legitimate means, even though both 
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corporations knew that this was not going to happen.154  Rio Tinto, on the other hand, 
requested the protection of its interests by the means of gross human rights 
violations.155  This makes a difference not just regarding the mental element, but also 
at the actus reus level, as Rio Tinto’s act went beyond indirect assistance and 
constituted active direct encouragement.156 
All of this shows that the mens rea standard of purpose is not applied equally in 
all cases, but that it is employed in its strict version only where the act constituting 
the actus reus is regarded as a legitimate commercial act that results in indirect 
assistance to human rights violations, such as the building of all-weather roads as 
part of the infrastructure of an investment project.  The nature of the act of 
assistance is thus relevant for the application of the purpose test in that courts are 
prepared to infer a purpose to assist in bringing about the violations where the act of 
providing assistance is either in itself unlawful or goes beyond a mere business 
activity, even if the primary aim was identified as making profit. 
C. Concluding Remarks 
As has become obvious, the various approaches to complicity liability under the 
ATS are highly influenced by the nature of the underlying act or transaction as 
commercial or business related.  While the approaches differ dramatically, 
particularly with regard to the relevant mens rea standard, they are all driven by the 
shared conviction that the nature of the underlying act or transaction as commercial 
or business related provides it with a cloak of prima facie legitimacy that complicates 
the liability analysis significantly, particularly in the context of the provision of goods 
or services that might have legitimate as well as illegitimate uses.  Before analyzing 
the different approaches, this Article will examine how comparable problems were 
addressed by courts in other contexts.  These experiences will then inform the 
response to the main questions at the heart of this Article, i.e., how to draw the line 
between lawful and legitimate commercial transactions and corporate complicity. 
II. COMPLICITY LIABILITY FOR DUAL-PURPOSE ACTS – 
LESSONS FROM THE AD HOC INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALS 
Ad hoc international criminal tribunals, whose jurisprudence heavily influenced 
the liability standards applied by U.S. courts in corporate complicity cases under the 
ATS,157 consistently apply an actus reus standard of an act of assistance that has a 
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request for “military action for its own private ends and directed the military response even ‘while reports 
of war crimes surfaced’”). 
 156.   See id. (“These allegations support much more than ‘an inference of mere knowledge on Rio 
Tinto’s part; it supports an inference that Rio Tinto actively encouraged the killing of Bougainvilleans.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 157.   See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 948 (9th Cir. 2002) (relying on standards set forth 
by the international criminal tribunals); Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 132–37 (stating that “the history and conduct 
of [international] tribunals is instructive” for deciding if corporations that allegedly aided and abetted the 
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substantial effect on the commission of the crime,158 coupled with a mens rea test of 
knowledge, rather than purpose.159  However, a recent controversy between different 
Appeals Chambers160 shows that even outside the particular context of corporate 
complicity liability, courts struggle to apply these standards to aiding and abetting 
liability in cases of dual-purpose acts, i.e., where the act of assistance has the 
potential to contribute both to lawful and unlawful activities of the principal 
offender.  This has clear similarities with the scenarios discussed in many of the 
corporate complicity cases under the ATS, such as the building of airstrips and all-
weather roads in South Sudan.161  While international criminal law does not provide 
for corporate liability,162 it could well apply to the directors of corporations for aiding 
and abetting those crimes for which the ad hoc tribunals have jurisdiction. 
The following discussion of two of the most recent decisions on aiding and 
abetting liability for dual purpose acts does not aim to assess the coherence of each 
approach in the context of the jurisprudence of the ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals and customary international law.  Instead, it will limit itself to highlighting 
the reasons behind the different approaches to aiding and abetting liability and to 
assessing what can be learned from this for liability standards in the context of 
corporate complicity. 
The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) discussed the question of dual-purpose liability in Perišić.163  
Perišić was accused of having assisted in the commission of crimes carried out by the 
Army of the Republika Srpska (VRS) through various acts, including the large-scale 
 
Nigerian government in committing human rights abuses were liable under the ATS). 
 158.   Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, para. 235 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Du[ko Tadi] (Prosecutor v. Tadić), Case No. IT-94-1-T, 
Judgment, para. 688 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Blagojević, 
Case No. IT-02-60-A, Appeals Judgement, paras. 127, 134 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
May 9, 2007). 
 159.   See, e.g., Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, para. 245 (stating that “it is not necessary for the 
accomplice to share the mens rea of the perpetrator,” but requiring only knowledge); Prosecutor v. 
Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Appeals Judgement, para. 102 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Feb. 25, 2004) (requiring “knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and abettor assist 
the commission of the specific crime of the principal”); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, 
Appeals Judgement, paras. 162–63 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000) (“[I]t is not 
necessary to show that the aider and abettor shared the mens rea of the principal, but it must be shown 
that the aider and abettor was aware of the relevant mens rea on the part of the principal.”); Prosecutor v. 
Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Appeals Judgement, para. 48 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Feb. 28, 2013) (finding that the relevant requirement is “knowledge that assistance aids the commission of 
criminal acts, along with awareness of the essential elements of these crimes”). 
 160.   Compare Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, para. 43 (reasoning in favor of an actus reus element of 
specific direction), with Prosecutor v. Šainović, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Appeals Judgement, para. 1649 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014) (deciding that specific direction “is not an element of 
aiding and abetting liability under customary international law”), and Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. 
SCSL-03-01-A, Appeals Judgment, para. 486 (Special Court for Sierra Leone Sept. 26, 2013) (“[T]he 
Appeals Chamber concludes that ‘specific direction’ is not an element of the actus reus of aiding and 
abetting liability . . . .”).  As Šainović does not provide a discussion of issues relevant to this Article, the 
discussion will focus on the decisions in Perišić and Taylor. 
 161.   Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 249 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 162.   See Ole Kristian Fauchald & Jo Stigen, Corporate Responsibility Before International Institutions, 
40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1025, 1035–39 (observing that international law does not allow for 
corporate criminal liability). 
 163.   Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A. 
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provision of military assistance, equipment, and supplies.164  He, however, alleged 
that he had provided his assistance to support the (lawful) general war effort of the 
VRS, not to aid and abet the crimes it committed.165  In Perišić, the Appeals Tribunal 
held that the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability not only required that the act 
have a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime, which is what most 
ICTY decisions limit their actus reus analysis to.166  Rather, relying on the Appeals 
Chamber decision in Tadić which first defined the actus reus standard to be applied 
by the ICTY, Perišić held that it was also required that the act be “specifically 
directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain 
specific crime (murder, extermination, rape, torture, wanton destruction of civilian 
property, etc.).”167 
According to the Appeals Chamber, the combination of substantial effect and 
knowledge alone could not in all cases adequately ensure that liability would only 
attach when a sufficient link between the accomplice and the principal offense exists, 
particularly where the accused is geographically removed from the commission of the 
offense, or the assistance consists of a dual-purpose act.168  In such cases, the relevant 
link cannot be established simply by showing that the assistance made a substantial 
contribution to the crimes committed.  Rather, in addition, “evidence establishing a 
direct link between the aid provided by an accused individual and the relevant crimes 
committed by principal perpetrators is necessary.”169 
The Appeals Chamber explained that specific direction “may involve 
considerations that are closely related to questions of mens rea [and] . . . evidence 
regarding an individual’s state of mind may serve as circumstantial evidence that 
assistance he or she facilitated was specifically directed towards charged crimes.”170  
This pragmatic approach aims to achieve at the actus reus level what the generally 
accepted test of knowledge prevents at the mens rea level; i.e., it aims to make 
liability subject to the requirement that the act be motivated by assisting an unlawful 
act.171 
 
 164.   Id. paras. 2–3, 54. 
 165.   Id. para. 20. 
 166.   For an overview, see Prosecutor v. Šainović, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Appeals Judgement, paras. 
1621–26 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014) (describing Perišić doctrine and 
subsequent applications). 
 167.   Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, para. 26 (citing Prosecutor v. Du[ko Tadi] (Prosecutor v. Tadić), 
Case No. IT-94-1-A, para. 229 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997)). 
 168.   Id. para. 39. 
 169.   Id. para. 44. 
 170.   Id. para. 48. 
 171.   In favor of this approach, see id. para. 4 (Meron, J. and Agius, J., separate opinion); Kai Ambos 
& Ousman Njikam, Charles Taylor’s Criminal Responsibility, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 789, 804–07 (2013); 
Kevin Jon Heller, Why the ICTY’s “Specifically Directed” Requirement Is Justified, OPINIO JURIS (June 2, 
2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/06/02/why-the-ictys-specifically-directed-requirement-is-justified/.  For a 
critical analysis see, for example Christopher Jenks, Prosecutor v. Perišić. Case No. IT-04-81-A, 107 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 622, 625 (2013); Marco Milanovic, The Limits of Aiding and Abetting Liability:  The ICTY 
Appeals Chamber Acquits Momcilo Perisic, EJIL:  TALK! (Mar. 11, 2013), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-
limits-of-aiding-and-abetting-liability-the-ICTY-appeals-chamber-acquits-momcilo-perisic/; James G. 
Stewart, Guest Post:  The ICTY Loses its Way on Complicity – Part 1, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 3, 2013) http:// 
opiniojuris.org/2013/04/03/guest-post-the-icty-loses-its-way-on-complicity-part-1/ [hereinafter Stewart 
(2013(2))].  See also Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, para. 3 (Liu, J., dissenting in part). 
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Addressing a question that has a clear parallel in the context of corporate 
complicity through commercial transactions with regimes that commit gross human 
rights violations, the Appeals Chamber emphasized that providing assistance to an 
organization that solely engages in criminal aims and activities might allow an 
inference that the assistance is specifically directed towards the commission of 
crimes.172  General assistance to an organization that carries out legitimate as well as 
criminal activities, on the other hand, cannot automatically be construed as being 
specifically directed towards the furtherance of the criminal activities.173  While 
evidence regarding the volume of assistance and knowledge of the crimes might 
establish substantial effect and “serve as circumstantial evidence of specific 
direction,”174 it “does not automatically establish a sufficient link between aid 
provided by an accused aider and abettor and the commission of crimes by principal 
perpetrators.”175  Instead, specific direction is only established if it is “the sole 
reasonable inference after a review of the evidentiary record as a whole.”176 
Based on its understanding of the relevant legal principles, the Appeals 
Chamber held that specific direction could not be shown on any count of aiding and 
abetting of which Perišić was accused.177  Even in light of the magnitude of the 
assistance provided, “the types of aid provided to the VRS do not appear 
incompatible with lawful military operations.”178  That the assistance was specifically 
directed “towards VRS crimes is [therefore] not the sole reasonable inference that 
can be drawn from the totality of the evidence on the record.”179  The overall 
conclusion was that 
while Perišić may have known of VRS crimes, the VJ aid he facilitated was 
directed towards the VRS’s general war effort rather than VRS crimes.  
Accordingly, . . . Perišić was not proved beyond reasonable doubt to have 
facilitated assistance specifically directed towards the VRS Crimes in 
Sarajevo and Srebrenica.180 
Applying this standard to corporate complicity cases, it would not be sufficient 
to show that a corporation knowingly provided substantial assistance for the 
commission of human rights violations.  Instead, a direct link between the act of 
assistance and the violations would need to be established, for which it would not be 
sufficient to demonstrate the quantity and significance of the assistance.  Rather, the 
only reasonable inference from all relevant facts would have to be that the assistance 
was specifically meant to further the human rights violations.181  In the context of the 
 
 172.   Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, para. 48. 
 173.   Id. paras. 52–53. 
 174.   Id. paras. 56, 68. 
 175.   Id. para. 56. 
 176.   Id. para. 68. 
 177.   Id. 
 178.   Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, para. 65. 
 179.   Id. para. 57. 
 180.   Id. para. 69. 
 181.   Id. para. 56 (citing Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Appeals Judgement, para. 202 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 17, 2009)); Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, 
Appeals Judgement, para. 219 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006). 
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South Africa case,182 for example, it would not be sufficient that financing was 
provided at a very large scale to the regime and its security forces, or that numerous 
military vehicles were sold to the regime.  Liability would rather depend on whether 
it could be demonstrated that the money was loaned, or the vehicles sold, in order to 
assist the regime with carrying out its atrocious crimes and not to assist it with 
exercising its legitimate governmental tasks.  However large scale the assistance, and 
notwithstanding the likelihood that the assistance would in reality go towards 
unlawful ends, no complicity liability would exist, unless it can be shown that it can 
only have been meant to further unlawful ends. 
Just like the U.S. courts deciding cases of corporate complicity liability, the 
ICTY was primarily motivated by the wish to limit aiding and abetting liability to 
situations in which a sufficiently close link between the act of assistance and the 
crime can be established.  However, the means through which the restriction is 
achieved differs from the various approaches under the ATS.  It is not relevant that 
the act of assistance is inherently harmful.  Nor is a direct purpose to bring about the 
violations required as part of the mens rea.  However, in practice, the actus reus 
element of specific direction might be comparable to the purpose element of mens 
rea, as it requires that the assistance be specifically aimed at furthering the crimes 
committed, and knowledge alone is not sufficient to infer specific direction. 
A few months after Perišić, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (SCSL) disagreed with Perišić in its Taylor decision on the crucial point 
of whether specific direction is necessary to establish a sufficiently close link between 
the accomplice and the crime, particularly in cases of dual purpose assistance.183  The 
Appeals Chamber of the SCSL insisted that this role could satisfactorily be assumed 
by the actus reus element of substantial effect184 and that a case-by-case analysis of 
the necessary proximity of the accomplice to the crime was both necessary and 
sufficient to distinguish the culpable from the innocent.185  Specifying further the 
criteria that should inform the actus reus analysis in each case, the Appeals Chamber 
suggested that: 
Merely providing the means to commit a crime is not sufficient to establish 
that an accused’s conduct was criminal.  Where the crime is an isolated act, 
the very fungibility of the means may establish that the accused is not 
sufficiently connected to the commission of the crime.  Similarly, on the 
facts of a case, an accused’s contribution to the causal stream leading to 
the commission of the crime may be insignificant or insubstantial, 
precluding a finding that his acts and conduct had a substantial effect on 
the crimes.  In terms of the effect of an accused’s acts and conduct on the 
commission of the crime through his assistance to a group or organisation, 
there is a readily apparent difference between an isolated crime and a 
crime committed in furtherance of a widespread and systematic attack on 
 
 182.   In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 183.   Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Appeals Judgment, paras. 473–80 (Special Court 
for Sierra Leone Sept. 26, 2013). 
 184.   Id. para. 390. 
 185.   Id. paras. 390–92, 480. 
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the civilian population.  The jurisprudence provides further guidance, but 
it is the differences between the facts of given cases that are decisive.186 
The Appeals Chamber thus embraces a case-by-case approach to the 
substantiality of the act of assistance.  Of particular relevance for the discussion of 
corporate complicity liability is the suggestion that the focus of the liability analysis 
needs to be on the actual effect of the assistance on the crime, not on its potential 
effect based on the nature of the product or service provided.187  This differs 
considerably from the approach to the actus reus element adopted in In re South 
African Apartheid Litigation.188 
Taylor also highlighted the importance of the qualitative and not just 
quantitative effect of assistance, e.g., where the accomplice, as in the case of Charles 
Taylor, provides supplies at a particularly crucial time.189  It further stressed that “an 
accused need not be the only source of assistance in order for his acts and conduct to 
have a substantial effect on the commission of the crimes.”190  Therefore, that only 
some of the supplies used for the commission of a crime can be attributed to the 
accomplice does not exclude liability but rather requires a thorough analysis of 
whether, taking into consideration the other sources of assistance, the accomplice’s 
“acts and conduct had a substantial effect on the commission of the crimes.”191 
Even though Charles Taylor was physically remote from the crimes committed, 
the Appeals Chamber confirmed his conviction as an accomplice because of the 
extensive, sustained, and vital nature of the assistance, and the key impact it had on 
the commission of the crimes.192  Moreover, “in addition to knowing of the 
[Revolutionary United Front (RUF)]/[Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(AFRC)]’s intent to commit crimes, Taylor was aware of the specific range of crimes 
being committed during the implementation of the RUF/AFRC’s Operational 
Strategy and was aware of the essential elements of the crimes.”193  He consequently 
also acted with the relevant mens rea.194 
The decision in Taylor shows that it is possible to determine the link between 
the assistance and the offense committed that is necessary to justify imposing aiding 
and abetting liability by combining an actus reus standard of substantial effect—to be 
established on a case-by-case basis—with a mens rea standard of knowledge.  In 
providing some interesting reflections on the elements that guide a case-by-case 
determination of substantial effect, many of which could equally be relevant for the 
actus reus assessment in corporate complicity cases, it offers an interesting 
alternative to the approach adopted in In re South African Apartheid Litigation. 
The Taylor decision has drawn criticism, though, in particular because of its 
“reliance on a vague ‘substantial effect’ requirement as the lone physical limitation 
 
 186.   Id. para. 391. 
 187.   Id. para. 394. 
 188.   In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 264–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (placing 
importance on the nature of the product provided). 
 189.   Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, para. 514. 
 190.   Id. para. 516. 
 191.   Id. 
 192.   Id. para. 520. 
 193.   Id. para. 540. 
 194.   Id. 
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on complicity liability”195 and for leaving “undefined the distinction between innocent 
and culpable aid in cases where,” unlike in Taylor itself, “the provision of assistance 
is not essential to the commission of an underlying offense.”196  This criticism is 
largely based on concerns specific to the context of international criminal law, which 
requires clarity in order not to lose legitimacy, and because individual criminal 
liability requires a high degree of legal certainty and foreseeability.197 
In light of Taylor, an analysis of the actus reus of corporate complicity liability 
would require a thorough examination of all the factors of the individual case.  
Where, for example, money is provided to a regime that commits gross human rights 
violations, liability would depend on how substantially the money assisted in the 
violations carried out by the regime, in light of all the different income sources it had 
at its disposal.  Similarly, regarding the sale of military vehicles, liability would 
depend on the systematic nature of the violations carried out with their help and how 
important the vehicles provided were for the commission of the offenses, among 
other factors.  At the same time, given that no showing of direct assistance is 
necessary,198 no link between the actual good sold and the violation carried out would 
need to be established.  Thus, a defendant could not avoid liability by alleging that 
massacres carried out could not be linked to the precise vehicle sold, or the money 
lent. 
The dispute between the two Appeals Chambers in Perišić and Taylor199 closely 
reflects the debate of the feasible liability standard in the context of corporate 
complicity, in particular regarding whether a combination of substantial effect at the 
objective level, and knowledge at the subjective level, leads to boundless liability or 
whether, if taken seriously, these criteria together can strike an adequate balance 
between overinclusiveness and impunity.  Just like in the context of corporate 
complicity under the ATS, the choice of liability standard seems to have depended 
largely on whether it was regarded to be unacceptable to provide knowing assistance 
only if it is clearly meant exclusively to be used for unlawful purposes, or whether 
assistance that has a dual purpose should result in liability if it is made with the 
knowledge that it will substantially further unlawful purposes. 
III. U.S. DOMESTIC CRIMINAL COMPLICITY CASES IN THE 
CONTEXT OF COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 
Important insights for the question of how to draw the line between legitimate 
business transactions and acts that trigger complicity liability can also be gained from 
 
 195.   Recent Case, Special Court for Sierra Leone Rejects “Specific Direction” Requirement for Aiding 
and Abetting Violations of International Law—Prosecutor v. Taylor, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1847, 1851 (2014). 
 196.   Id. 
 197.   Id. at 1851, 1853–54. 
 198.   Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, paras. 357, 362. 
 199.   The decision in Prosecutor v. Šainović, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Appeals Judgement (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014), in which the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY held, in clear 
disagreement with Perišić, that the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability does not require a 
demonstration of specific direction, has not been discussed because the decision does not provide a 
detailed discussion of the implications of applying or rejecting a specific direction requirement on the facts 
of the case, but rather focuses its analysis on the legal question of the relevant standard.  Id. paras. 1617–
51. 
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U.S. domestic complicity cases.  Quite a few courts had to tackle the problem of the 
limits of complicity liability, in the form of conspiracy, aiding and abetting, or both, 
where the act of assistance consisted of a commercial transaction. 
In U.S. criminal law, it seems that, in principle, every act of assistance can 
qualify for aiding and abetting liability, without any requirement that it have a 
substantial effect on the commission of the crime.200  This, of course, would 
potentially lead to very far-reaching liability, particularly in the commercial context, 
which might explain why courts put a lot of effort into finding principles according to 
which such liability can be limited. 
A good starting point for an analysis of criminal complicity cases is provided by 
the influential Peoni case, which introduced a mens rea test of purpose to U.S. 
criminal complicity law.  In Peoni, Judge Learned Hand made the often repeated 
statement that the various definitions of complicity liability “have nothing whatever 
to do with the probability that the forbidden result would follow upon the accessory’s 
conduct.”201  Instead, “they all demand that he in some sort associate himself with the 
venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that 
he seek by his action to make it succeed.  All the words used—even the most 
colorless, ‘abet’—carry an implication of purposive attitude towards it.”202  This very 
closely resembles the purpose test applied by many courts in the context of ATS 
litigation and makes clear that mere knowledge, coupled with a relevant act of 
assistance, would not suffice to trigger complicity liability. 
Of particular relevance for corporate complicity liability is Falcone, a case 
where the complicity charge was based on the accusation that the defendant had sold 
large amounts of sugar, i.e., a product that clearly has lawful uses and no inherently 
harmful qualities (at least none that are relevant in the context of the commission of 
crime) to customers who then sold it to illegal distilleries.203  The question before the 
court was “whether the seller of goods, in themselves innocent, becomes . . . an 
abettor of . . . the buyer because he knows that the buyer means to use the goods to 
commit a crime.”204  The court issued a strong warning against an approach that 
attributes liability simply because someone “does not forego a normally lawful 
activity, of the fruits of which he knows that others will make an unlawful use.”205  
Such a doctrine would carry a risk “of great oppression”206 which can only be avoided 
by closely limiting the scope of liability to the cases in which the accomplice “in some 
sense promote[s] their venture himself, make[s] it his own, ha[s] a stake in its 
outcome.”207 
Falcone was sometimes relied on for the suggestion that legal sales can never 
amount to conspiracy, even if the seller knows that they will be used for illegal 
 
 200.   18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2014); Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider 
and Abettor and the Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1347–48 (2002). 
 201.   United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938). 
 202.   Id. 
 203.   United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 580 (2d Cir. 1940) (describing how plaintiff sold large 
quantities of sugar to grocers who subsequently sold the sugar to illegal distilleries). 
 204.   Id. at 581. 
 205.   Id. 
 206.   Id. 
 207.   Id. 
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL  Volume 50, Issue 3 
2015] DOING BUSINESS WITH BAD ACTORS 437 
 
purposes.208  However, this view was rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Direct 
Sales.209  A registered drug manufacturer and wholesaler who conducted a nationwide 
mail-order business had supplied a registered physician with vast quantities of 
morphine sulphate, which the latter then illegally distributed to addicts.210  The Court 
held that Falcone does not stand for a general proposition that “one who sells to 
another with knowledge that the buyer will use the article for an illegal purpose 
cannot, under any circumstances, be found guilty of conspiracy with the buyer to 
further his illegal end.”211  Liability would instead depend on the nature of the 
commodities sold.  While the goods in Falcone were sugar, cans, and other such 
goods, and therefore articles of free commerce, the morphine sulphate sold in Direct 
Sales was a restricted commodity, “incapable of further legal use except by 
compliance with rigid regulations.”212  The significance of this difference was 
like that between toy pistols or hunting rifles and machine guns.  All 
articles of commerce may be put to illegal ends.  But all do not have 
inherently the same susceptibility to harmful and illegal use.  Nor, by the 
same token, do all embody the same capacity, from their very nature, for 
giving the seller notice the buyer will use them unlawfully.  Gangsters, not 
hunters or small boys, comprise the normal private market for machine 
guns.  So drug addicts furnish the normal outlet for morphine which gets 
outside the restricted channels of legitimate trade.213 
For the Court, the relevance of the nature of the goods was twofold:  to make 
“certain that the seller knows the buyer’s intended illegal use . . . [and] to show that 
by the sale he intends to further, promote and cooperate in it.”214  Regarding the 
relationship between intent and knowledge, the Court observed that even though 
intent “is not identical with mere knowledge that another purposes unlawful action, 
it is not unrelated to such knowledge.  Without the knowledge, the intent cannot 
exist.”215  Whether goods have an inherent capacity for harm or have their sale 
restricted “makes a difference in the quantity of proof required to show knowledge 
that the buyer will utilize the article unlawfully.”216  However, “not every instance of 
sale of restricted goods, harmful as are opiates, in which the seller knows the buyer 
intends to use them unlawfully, will support a charge of conspiracy.”217  This would 
rather depend on additional facts, such as whether a single transaction rather than a 
 
 208.   See United States v. Piampiano, 271 F.2d 273, 274 (2d Cir. 1959) (noting appellant’s reliance on 
Falcone for the proposition that “a mere supplier, even one aware of the illegal purpose of his purchaser, 
cannot be held as a co-conspirator”). 
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large quantities of morphine sulphate by mail with the intent to further the physician’s illegal drug sales, 
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continuous business relationship was at issue, and whether it involved “nothing more 
on the seller’s part than indifference to the buyer’s illegal purpose and passive 
acquiescence in his desire to purchase.”218 
The Court concluded from the aggressive sales practices of the supplier of the 
morphine sulphate and the long cooperation with the physician who supplied this 
drug illegally to addicts that the defendant not only knew and acquiesced, but 
moreover had “a ‘stake in the venture’ which, even if it may not be essential, is not 
irrelevant to the question of conspiracy,”219 the stake being “making the profits which 
it knew could come only from its encouragement of Tate’s illicit operations.”220 
Liability thus followed from a combination of different factors, ranging from the 
nature of the goods as restricted so that they could not be sold on the free market, to 
the sales practices and the duration of the buyer/seller relationship.  In addition to 
knowledge, intent was necessary which could not be inferred from knowledge alone, 
but from knowledge coupled with particular features of the act of assistance, such as 
its continuous nature.221  The nature and intensity of the act of assistance is thus 
relevant primarily for an inference of the mens rea in the form of knowledge and 
intent, but is not regarded as fulfilling the function of weeding out, already at the 
actus reus level, acts that simply are not sufficiently pertinent to qualify as criminally 
relevant assistance with the principal offense.  It is not clear, on the other hand, what 
level of knowledge would be required to infer intent where the goods at issue were 
neutral and/or unrestricted. 
For corporate complicity liability, this would have the implication that liability 
might, just like the court in In re South African Apartheid Litigation suggested,222 be 
highly influenced by the nature of the goods and services as harmless, neutral or 
unrestricted, as opposed to inherently harmful or restricted by law.  However, the 
impact of this does not materialize at the actus reus level.  Instead it influences the 
quantity of proof required to establish knowledge of and intent regarding the 
unlawful use that will be made of the goods provided, which can be inferred much 
more easily where the nature of the good invites such a use.  However, even in the 
case of restricted or inherently harmful goods, a case-by-case analysis is necessary to 
determine the actual existence or absence of knowledge and intent.  Given that 
intent requires having a stake in the venture,223 corporate complicity liability would 
then depend on questions such as whether the corporation benefits from the 
successful commission of the principal offense.  While this might exceptionally be the 
case in situations such as that of Rio Tinto,224 in most cases of corporate complicity in 
human rights violations it will be difficult to satisfy this criterion.  For example, in In 
 
 218.   Id. at 712 n.8. 
 219.   Id. at 713. 
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 221.   See Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 711, 713 (stating that “[w]hile [intent] is not identical with mere 
knowledge that another purposes unlawful action, it is not unrelated to such knowledge,” and when there 
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 222.   In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 258–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 223.   See Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 713 (finding allegations were sufficient to support theory of liability 
because defendant had acquired a stake in the venture). 
 224.   Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 766 (9th Cir. 2011) (Schroeder, J., plurality opinion) 
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re South African Apartheid Litigation, for the corporations’ business interests it will 
have been irrelevant whether or not the military committed extrajudicial killings with 
the vehicles sold.225  This might be different in cases where sales of particular goods 
soar because of the human rights violations for which they are needed, for example 
where the demand for weapons depends on sustaining the conflict or repression in a 
given country, or where goods are specifically tailored for the commission of 
violations, such as the computer programs that were designed to implement 
apartheid policies. 
In light of Falcone and Direct Sales, some courts answered the question that the 
court in Blankenship aptly summarized as “Where does the ‘mere’ sale end, the 
conspiracy begin?”226 by stating that the supply of “goods, innocent in themselves . . . 
to a purchaser who, to the supplier’s knowledge, intends to and does use them in the 
furtherance of an illegal conspiracy”227 does not cross the complicity threshold.228  In 
Blankenship, however, a case in which one of the defendants leased his house trailer 
to a group that was to use it to cook methamphetamine, accepted a down-payment 
for the lease but then got cold feet and dropped out of the agreement,229 the court 
was not entirely convinced by the approach adopted in those two cases.  While “[o]ne 
may draw a line, as Falcone and Direct Sales did, between knowledge of other 
persons’ crimes and intent to join them,”230 the court expressed doubts that the 
criteria to determine the circumstances in which an inference of intent to join was 
permissible were delineated clearly enough by the courts.231  It suggested instead that 
a more functional approach would be to ask “whether the imposition of liability on 
transactions of the class depicted by the case would deter crime without adding 
unduly to the costs of legitimate transactions.”232  Thus, the court moved the focus of 
the analysis from the mens rea of wishing the crime to succeed to policy 
considerations of deterrence and a cost/benefit assessment of imposing liability. 
This modified approach built on several decisions in which courts applied a 
mens rea test of purpose but centered the liability analysis on the deterrence of 
crime.  The question of deterrence lay, for example, at the heart of the discussions of 
hypothetical complicity scenarios related to prostitution, presented in slight variation 
in different decisions.  Fountain, for example compared two hypothetical cases: 
In the first, a shopkeeper sells dresses to a woman whom he knows to be a 
prostitute.  The shopkeeper would not be guilty of aiding and abetting 
prostitution unless the prosecution could establish the elements of Judge 
 
 225.   See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 243 (discussing the sale of military 
vehicles to the South African government). 
 226.   United States v. Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283, 286 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 227.   United States v. Campisi, 306 F.2d 308, 310 (2d Cir. 1962) (quoting United States v. Tramaglino, 
197 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1952)). 
 228.   Id. at 310–11. 
 229.   Blankenship, 970 F.2d at 284. 
 230.   Id. at 286. 
 231.   See id. (arguing that differentiating between a mere sale of goods and participation in a 
conspiracy by drawing a line between knowledge of other persons’ crimes  and intent to join them is 
problematic because it restates the elements of a conspiracy without indicating “when an inference of 
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Hand’s test.  Little would be gained by imposing criminal liability in such a 
case.  Prostitution, anyway a minor crime, would be but trivially deterred, 
since the prostitute could easily get her clothes from a shopkeeper ignorant 
of her occupation.  In the second case, a man buys a gun from a gun dealer 
after telling the dealer that he wants it in order to kill his mother-in-law, 
and he does kill her.  The dealer would be guilty of aiding and abetting the 
murder.  This liability would help to deter—and perhaps not trivially given 
public regulation of the sale of guns—a most serious crime.  We hold that 
aiding and abetting murder is established by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the supplier of the murder weapon knew the purpose for which 
it would be used.233 
Thus, deterrence considerations made the court move from a standard of 
purpose to one of knowledge if commercial transactions assist with the commission 
of the most serious crimes: “One who sells a gun to another knowing that he is 
buying it to commit a murder, would hardly escape conviction as an accessory to the 
murder by showing that he received full price for the gun.”234  The fact that the act of 
assistance will in all likelihood have been primarily, if not exclusively, motivated by 
business considerations is clearly regarded to be irrelevant in this scenario.  Under 
this approach, a mens rea test of knowledge should be sufficient in corporate 
complicity cases, given the seriousness of the human rights violations that are at 
stake in these cases. 
In Giovannetti, the court further developed the policy considerations raised in 
Fountain, and approached the question of triviality slightly differently.  Changing the 
example to the sale of an address book to a prostitute, the court observed that the 
seller 
can hardly be said to be seeking by his action to make her venture succeed, 
since the transaction has very little to do with that success and his 
livelihood will not be affected appreciably by whether her venture 
succeeds or fails.  And, what may well be the same point seen from 
another angle, punishing him would not reduce the amount of 
prostitution—the prostitute, at an infinitesimal cost in added 
inconvenience, would simply shop for address books among stationers who 
did not know her trade.235 
The observation that deterrence would not be served by punishing the seller of 
the address book, as it could easily be obtained elsewhere from an unsuspecting 
seller, is interesting and goes back to the question of the free availability of the goods 
on the market, raised by the Supreme Court in Direct Sales.236  However, decreasing 
crime generally is not the only goal of deterrence.  At the individual level, deterrence 
aims to discourage individuals from committing criminal acts with the relevant mens 
rea.237  To exclude an act from any form of liability on the basis that someone else 
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would have done the same, with or without the relevant mens rea, completely 
ignores the individual aspect of deterrence and would result in unjustified impunity 
of those who themselves meet the applicable liability criteria.  The relevant question 
should therefore not be whether the assistance would have easily been available 
from other sources, but rather whether or not the act of assistance, if carried out with 
the relevant mens rea, was substantial enough for the commission of the crime to 
warrant the accomplices criminal liability. 
If, as Giovannetti suggests, it was decisive whether the seller’s livelihood 
depended on the success of the principal offense, this would presumably also exclude 
the liability of the seller of the gun in the Fountain example, for it can hardly be 
relevant to the seller whether or not the buyer commits murder with the gun, uses it 
for lawful purposes, or does not use it at all.  More relevant seems to be the court’s 
statement that “the transaction has very little to do” with the success of the crime,238 
which points towards the requirement of a link between the assistance rendered and 
the principal offense.  In all of these cases this issue was regarded as a mens rea 
consideration.  Only where a sufficient link exists between the assistance and the 
crime can it be inferred that by rendering the assistance the accomplice desired its 
success. 
Blankenship brought yet another consideration into the discussion of the 
prostitution examples.  The court commented that to hold the stationer in the 
prostitution example liable as an accomplice would not significantly deter 
prostitution, but “raise the costs of legitimate business, for it would either turn sellers 
into snoops (lest they sell to the wrong customers) or lead them to hire blind clerks 
(lest they learn too much about their customers); either way, the costs of business 
would rise, and honest customers would pay more.”239  It is not, however, clear why 
complicity liability would create the risk of turning businesspeople into snoops and 
thereby raise the costs of legitimate business transactions, as none of the liability 
standards under discussion in the criminal law context impose on businesses the 
obligation to find out the motivations behind the commercial transactions of their 
customers.  As the court in Blankenship itself explains, “[b]ecause a lessor almost 
inevitably knows his tenant’s business, the imposition of a criminal penalty is likely 
to deter but not to raise the costs of legitimate transactions.”240  If liability depends on 
actual knowledge, which seems to be the minimum mens rea standard in criminal 
complicity cases, the imposition of liability would not raise the costs of legitimate 
transactions while potentially deterring those that further crime. 
In Irwin, though not in the context of assistance in the form of commercial 
transactions, the court provided an interesting analysis of the interrelatedness of the 
various elements of complicity liability.  The court highlighted that in cases “where 
the evidence of the defendant’s intent must be inferred from the aid given,”241 the act 
and intent elements of complicity liability “really merge and our review focuses on 
whether the aid given was sufficient to support the inference of intent to further the 
crime.”242  The court suggested that “[b]ecause the aid that the defendant gave often 
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pulls double duty . . . as direct evidence of affirmative assistance and circumstantial 
evidence of intent,”243 a case might be made to modify the analysis by focusing 
instead “on the amount of assistance knowingly given.”244  It then discussed in some 
detail the implications of removing any requirement for desire to make the offense 
succeed from the mens rea of complicity liability and commented that it was unlikely 
that someone would provide material assistance without any desire that the crime 
succeed.245  Instead, “[m]aterial assistance deliberately given is itself evidence of 
intent.”246  This differs fundamentally from Peoni and Falcone, as it can hardly be said 
that every accomplice who provides deliberate assistance has a stake in the venture. 
The court in Irwin was reluctant to drop the intent element completely and 
rather suggested that liability would be justified either where material assistance was 
rendered knowingly, or where minor assistance was provided with intent.247  
Regarding the threshold the act of assistance must meet to justify an inference of 
intent, the court ruled out that trivial assistance could support such an inference, 
while critical assistance clearly would,248 and emphasized that “[t]here is no magic 
formula to easily determine on which side of the sufficiency line the evidence in a 
case falls.”249  Thus, a case-by-case analysis would be necessary to determine whether, 
in any given case, the assistance was sufficiently important to justify an inference of 
intent. 
The analysis of these cases shows that in domestic criminal law cases, U.S. 
courts apply a mixture of approaches in order to limit complicity liability for 
commercial acts that assist with the commission of criminal offenses.  Even though, 
in principle, any act of assistance seems to be sufficient to satisfy the actus reus 
requirement of complicity liability, without having to meet a substantiality or 
materiality threshold, courts generally agree that the application of such a test would 
lead to too far-reaching liability in the context of commercial transactions.  Since the 
influential Peoni decision, most courts seem to have accepted that intent in these 
cases cannot simply be inferred from knowing participation, but instead requires a 
showing that the accomplice have a stake in the venture.  This, however, has caused 
its own problems, which courts try to overcome in different ways.  Some courts shift 
the focus of the analysis to questions of deterrence and the costs of imposing liability 
on ordinary commercial activities;250 others consider the impact of the substantial or 
trivial nature of the goods and the transactions on inferring both knowledge and 
intent.251  The seriousness of the principal offense is another consideration.252 
 
 243.   Id. 
 244.   Id. 
 245.   Id. 
 246.   Id. 
 247.   Irwin, 149 F.3d at 572–73 
 248.   Id. at 573. 
 249.   Id. 
 250.   United States v. Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283, 287 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 251.   See Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 710–15 (1943) (relying on distinctions 
between restricted goods that are inherently susceptible to harmful or illegal use and “normal goods” and 
the distinction between isolated, small-scale sales and recurring large-scale sales to find that suppliers 
engaging in massive sales of goods that are inherently susceptible to illegal use likely acted with intent). 
 252.   See United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 798 (7th Cir. 1985) (suggesting that courts may take 
into account the seriousness of the offense when determining whether a supplier is criminally liable for 
aiding and abetting). 
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL  Volume 50, Issue 3 
2015] DOING BUSINESS WITH BAD ACTORS 443 
 
IV. ASSESSING THE DIFFERENT LIABILITY STANDARDS 
The preceding overview of case law from different contexts shows that the 
attribution of secondary liability in the context of acts that are facially lawful or could 
serve both lawful and unlawful purposes is complex and highly controversial.  The 
one clear tendency that all approaches share is that of searching for criteria 
according to which to limit liability to cases where a sufficient link between the 
assistance and the principal offense can be established.  Fundamental differences, 
however, materialize when it comes to the question of what link to regard as 
necessary and sufficient to justify the imposition of complicity liability in the context 
of commercial transactions.  The answer to this question seems to depend largely on 
each court’s view of how the various interests and policy considerations should be 
balanced, and, in particular, under what circumstances an otherwise legitimate act 
turns into an unlawful act of assistance in a third party’s crimes or human rights 
violations. 
As has become obvious, the various approaches to complicity liability under the 
ATS and U.S. domestic criminal law are highly influenced by the nature of the 
underlying act or transaction as commercial or business related.  However, unless 
commercial acts are per se exempt from complicity liability, which is not an approach 
favored by any of the courts dealing with corporate complicity cases, to identify the 
underlying act as commercial can and should be only the starting point of the 
discussion, focusing the analysis on whether this nature of the act justifies specific 
liability standards, and if so, which. 
While agreement exists that carrying out ordinary business transactions or 
other lawful acts with the knowledge that they might assist in gross human 
rights violations or crimes, without more, should not give rise to liability, 
differences arise with regard to what more is required to justify the imposition 
of aiding and abetting liability.  This question has been answered differently by 
different courts.  One approach combines an actus reus test of substantial effect 
with a mens rea requirement of knowledge.  Within that approach, differences 
exist as to whether the question of substantial effect should be determined on a 
case-by-case basis,253 by adopting an approach that focuses on the nature of the 
assistance,254 or by requiring that the act be specifically directed to the 
commission of unlawful acts.255 
Closely linked to the approach in Perišić, other courts restrict liability primarily 
at the mens rea level and require a mens rea of primary purpose256 or intent in the 
form of having a stake in the success of the principal offense.257  The focus in Doe I v. 
Nestle on the fact that the defendant corporations directly benefited from the human 
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rights violations258 points in a similar direction.  Other courts to some extent combine 
the evaluation of actus reus and mens rea elements and make the evidence that is 
necessary to infer knowledge and intent at the mens rea level dependent on the 
nature of the act.259 
It becomes clear that the commercial nature of the act of assistance has an 
impact on approaches both to the actus reus and mens rea in complicity cases.  Given 
that the liability standards, at the actus reus and mens rea levels (and combined), 
play the role of determining the “more” that is necessary to turn a commercial 
activity into an act of corporate complicity, it is important to be clear about the 
implications of the different approaches that can be adopted in this respect.  If the 
“more” is to be found at the actus reus level, it would have to embody an activity that 
goes beyond making a mere commercial transaction.  In a mens rea–based 
interpretation, on the other hand, the “more” would be the mental element with 
which the commercial transaction was carried out.  Where both elements are 
combined, it might well be that stricter actus reus standards can be balanced out by 
relaxing the mens rea standard or vice-versa. 
A. The Actus Reus Analysis 
In the context of commercial transactions, no courts seem to adopt the 
approach that the knowing provision of any assistance, however trivial, results in 
complicity liability.  Instead, all courts that apply a knowledge standard of mens rea 
require some form of materiality or substantiality of the act of assistance for the 
commission of the principal offense.  Indeed, the triviality of the assistance in the 
prostitution examples given by U.S. courts in the domestic criminal complicity 
context makes clear why assistance that has no more than a minimal effect on the 
commission of the offense should not result in liability. 
However, in the context of commercial transactions, particularly the provision 
of goods or services that might have legitimate as well as illegitimate uses, to 
determine the materiality or substantial effect of assistance can be difficult.260  This is 
because in many cases no direct link between the assistance and the violations can 
easily be established, for example where fungible goods are provided by several 
corporations to a regime that might use them for lawful as well as unlawful purposes.  
It will then often be impossible to determine whose goods were used for violations 
and whose for lawful purposes.  To determine with precision at which point 
assistance crosses the threshold from the trivial to the substantial also might not 
always be obvious. 
The court in In re South African Apartheid Litigation tried to overcome these 
difficulties by making the decision of whether or not assistance has a substantial 
effect on the commission of human rights violations dependent on objective 
characteristics of the act of assistance.261  In cases in which the act of assistance 
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consists of the lawful provision of commercial goods or services that do not have 
inherently harmful qualities and are not the direct means through which the 
violations are carried out, the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability is not met, so 
that such acts are exempt from complicity liability.262  While this question was not 
expressly addressed by the court, this would presumably apply even if such an act 
was motivated by the purpose of bringing about gross human rights violations.  
However, a business activity can no longer be regarded as neutral and exempt from 
liability if it consists of providing the direct means through which a violation is 
carried out, if the goods or services provided are inherently harmful, or where goods 
or services are specifically tailored to assisting the business partner with the 
violations.263  Such acts, combined with knowledge that the activities have a 
substantial effect on the commission of the violations, pass the complicity 
threshold.264 
To limit the actus reus in cases of commercial activities in such an absolute way 
might have the advantage of providing a clear-cut approach which removes the need 
to develop more refined criteria according to which the substantial effect of 
commercial activities on gross human rights violations can be established.265  
However, while it is necessary to find a principled way to distinguish between 
acceptable business activities and those that give rise to complicity liability, and to 
avoid casting the net so widely that corporations are held indiscriminately liable for 
all offenses committed by regimes with which they do business, the approach to the 
actus reus of aiding and abetting liability adopted in In re South African Apartheid 
Litigation raises several fundamental problems.266 
In eliminating any need to perform a case-by-case analysis of the effect of the 
act of assistance on the violation, and of the closeness of the defendant to it, this 
approach shields certain acts (such as the sale of goods that are not inherently 
harmful but might potentially be used for harmful purposes) automatically from 
liability.  A corporation could, for example, escape liability by selling only 
commercial, but not military, vehicles to a regime, with the knowledge or even intent 
that they will be used to commit gross human rights violations.  At the same time, it 
seems that the inherently harmful nature of the goods or services in and of itself 
gives rise to an assumption of substantial effect, whether or not this effect actually 
materializes in the individual case.267  This is an anomaly in both criminal and civil 
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law, where the attribution of responsibility usually depends on an analysis of the 
facts of each case, not on a categorical approach that excludes liability for a whole 
species of acts based on their abstract nature. 
It might well be that military vehicles have a more substantial effect on the 
commission of violations, that a causal link between the sale and the violation can be 
shown more easily in that case, or that the necessary mens rea might be more easily 
discerned.  However, while it might be easier to link vehicles with extrajudicial 
killings if they have a military customization that makes their use for harmful 
purposes more likely while such a link might be more difficult to establish where 
vehicles do not have such specifications, it is doubtful that the imposition of liability 
is justified by the abstract nature of the act or product, rather than by its effect on the 
commission of the violations that were carried out.  Where the impact of the sale on 
the violations is the same, it is difficult to see on what grounds the two sales should 
be distinguished at the actus reus level, the function of which is to establish the 
necessary link between the act of assistance and the commission of the principal 
offense.268  In the example of the sale of vehicles, it should instead be necessary to 
demonstrate in each case that the sale of a military vehicle had a substantial effect on 
the commission of the crimes, or, conversely, that the sale of ordinary vehicles did 
not.  Otherwise there is a risk of both under- and overinclusiveness. 
A risk of underinclusiveness would exist because a considerable gap in 
corporate accountability would be created, encouraging, or at least providing no 
incentive to refrain from, business transactions that facilitate gross human rights 
violations other than by providing the direct means for their commission.  Such an 
approach would imply that it is acceptable and legitimate for corporations to provide 
business partners with inherently neutral goods or services, if they know, or 
potentially even wish, that they make a substantial contribution to the commission of 
gross human rights violations. 
Such an approach might also have unfair consequences of over-inclusiveness by 
presuming causation where inherently dangerous goods are provided to a regime 
that commits grave human rights violations, even if the transaction was not 
prohibited and might even have been politically encouraged, without any showing 
that the provision of the product, did, in fact, have a substantial effect on the 
commission of human rights violations.  According to the court in In re South 
African Apartheid Litigation, “[a]lthough such goods may have legitimate uses, that 
issue is addressed by the mens rea element.”269  At first sight it might seem odd that 
the use of a product should be a mens rea rather than an actus reus concern.  The 
court must have had in mind an assumption that the provision of inherently harmful 
products satisfies the actus reus requirement.  Complicity liability can then only be 
avoided if the corporation demonstrates that it was unaware of the harmful use the 
business partner would make of the inherently harmful products.  The fine line 
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between acceptable business transactions and complicity liability would rest on mens 
rea alone in those cases. 
A categorical approach to the actus reus as suggested in In re South African 
Apartheid Litigation thus leads to arbitrary results.  The imposition of liability should 
instead depend on a thorough analysis in each case in which complicity in gross 
human rights violations is alleged.  This was also the conclusion of the Appeals 
Chamber of the SCSL in Taylor, which regarded a case-by-case approach for 
determining the substantial effect of an act of assistance as both necessary and 
sufficient in order to establish the relevant link between the assistance and the 
principal offense.270  The tribunal rejected a categorical approach to determining the 
actus reus of aiding and abetting liability, even in cases of dual purpose acts that 
might include commercially-based activities.271  Unlike the approach in In re South 
African Apartheid Litigation, the tribunal in Taylor held that the focus of the analysis 
had to be on the specific effect of the assistance in each case, not on an abstract 
assessment of its dangerousness.272  It rightly pointed out that “perfectly innocuous 
items, such as satellite phones, could be used to assist the commission of crimes, 
while instruments of violence could be used lawfully.  The distinction between 
criminal and non-criminal acts of assistance is not drawn on the basis of the act in the 
abstract, but on its effect in fact.”273  The focus of the liability analysis therefore needs 
to be on the actual effect of the assistance on the crime, not on its potential effect 
based on the nature of the product or service provided. 
Instead of developing a checklist of factors that need to be met, or identifying 
situations in which liability is always excluded, the SCSL made clear that the analysis 
would always have to take account of the circumstances as a whole, as the culpability 
of an accomplice can only be determined based on an assessment of all relevant 
factors in each case.274  Where the assistance was provided to a group or organization, 
for example, the tribunal in Taylor did not conclude that the actus reus of aiding and 
abetting could not be satisfied unless the group exclusively dedicated itself to 
pursuing criminal purposes.  Rather, this depends on the circumstances, and one 
important factor for finding substantial effect might be that the assistance was given 
in the context of widespread and systematic crimes, rather than one isolated criminal 
act.275  Nevertheless, the court in Blankenship rightly emphasized that “[s]ometimes a 
single transaction extends over a substantial period and is the equivalent of enduring 
supply,”276 as in Giovannetti, which involved premises leased for the purpose of illegal 
gambling.277  This confirms the main message in Taylor that in the end, the overall 
assessment will depend on the circumstances of each case. 
Where the assistance provided was not the only source of assistance the 
principal offender obtained, the effect of the accomplice’s act on the commission of 
 
 270.   Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Appeals Judgment, paras. 390–91 (Special Court 
for Sierra Leone Sept. 26, 2013). 
 271.   Id. paras. 393–95. 
 272.   Id. para. 395. 
 273.   Id. 
 274.   Id. paras. 390–91. 
 275.   Id. para. 391. 
 276.   United States v. Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283, 287 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 277.   United States v. Giovanetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1225 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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the crimes overall is regarded as crucial.  It is consequently important to assess in 
each case the effect of the assistance on the crime, based on the quantity and quality 
of the assistance, including its timing and whatever other factors might be relevant in 
each case.  As highlighted in Perišić, substantial effect can, for example, be 
established based on the volume of assistance.278  And in his dissent in Perišić, Judge 
Liu opined that substantial effect depends on factors such as “the magnitude, critical 
importance, and continued nature of the assistance.”279 
In light of Taylor, an analysis of the actus reus of corporate complicity liability 
would require a thorough examination of all the factors of the individual case.  
Where, for example, money is provided to a regime that commits gross human rights 
violations, liability would depend on how substantially the money assisted the 
violations carried out by the regime, in light of all the different income sources it had 
at its disposal.  Similarly, regarding the sale of military vehicles, liability would 
depend on the systematic nature of the violations carried out with the vehicles’ help 
and how important the vehicles provided were for the commission of the offenses, 
among other factors.  At the same time, given that no showing of direct assistance is 
necessary, no link between the actual goods sold and the violation carried out would 
need to be established, so a defendant could not avoid liability by alleging that 
massacres carried out could not be linked to the precise vehicle sold, or the money 
lent. 
Even though the definition of “substantial effect” on a case-by-case basis is 
clearly not easy and straightforward, such an analysis nevertheless provides the most 
convincing way to establish liability at the actus reus level.  Furthermore, it cannot 
easily be avoided, as it is even relevant in determining whether the mens rea 
requirement is satisfied if the purpose standard is applied, since many courts link the 
inference of purpose to the substantiality of the assistance.  Accordingly, even the 
adoption of a heightened mens rea standard of purpose does not make the 
potentially complicated substantiality analysis obsolete, unless, as in some ATS 
cases, courts apply it in such a way that a finding of purpose is effectively excluded in 
cases in which the act of assistance was a commercial or business-related activity that 
was primarily motivated by business interests. 
B. The Mens Rea Analysis 
Some courts in ATS litigation280 and some U.S. criminal courts281 impose 
restrictions at the mens rea level and regard a particularly blameworthy mental state 
in the form of purpose as the “more” that needs to be present in order to turn an 
otherwise lawful and acceptable business activity into a reprehensible act of 
complicity.  The ICTY Appeals Chamber’s decision in Perišić applied—though at the 
actus reus level—a comparable approach, in cases of dual-purpose acts that can only 
result in liability if they were rendered with the aim of furthering unlawful 
 
 278.   Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Appeals Judgement, paras. 56, 68 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). 
 279.   Id. para. 9 (Liu, J., dissenting in part). 
 280.   E.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 258–59 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 281.   E.g., United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1940); United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 
401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938). 
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purposes.282  In order to assess whether this is the test according to which liability for 
corporate complicity in human rights violations should be determined, it is important 
to be clear about the reasons behind and the implications of such an approach. 
1. The Relevance of the Nature of the Act for Defining and Inferring 
Purpose 
The commercial nature of the act of assistance is relevant both as a justification 
for imposing a mens rea standard of purpose and for how the purpose test is applied 
in individual cases.  Under the ATS, courts are prepared to infer purpose to facilitate 
violations carried out by the principal from the knowing act of providing assistance 
that is either in itself unlawful or goes beyond a mere business activity, even when 
profit is the primary aim.283  On the other hand, they refuse to infer purpose from 
engagement in ordinary commercial activities undertaken with the knowledge that 
they will assist the commission of human rights violations.284  Indeed, the fact that 
these activities are usually business motivated speaks against an inference of purpose 
for these courts.285 
Courts that apply a purpose test recognize that the purpose to facilitate the 
commission of the offense can, and in fact often must, be inferred from the act of 
assistance itself or from the surrounding circumstances.286  Short of a confession with 
regard to the accomplice’s mens rea, the mental element will have to be established 
based on circumstantial evidence, which in most cases will make it necessary to resort 
to the aider and abettor’s knowledge with regard to the consequences of the act of 
assistance.287  As courts are not prepared to infer purpose from the knowing 
undertaking of ordinary commercial transactions, this approach largely seems to 
exclude any corporate complicity liability outside of already objectively unlawful 
business transactions. 
An exception to this approach can be found in Doe I v. Nestle, where the court 
was prepared to infer purpose even though the act of assistance—providing 
assistance to cocoa farmers—was not unlawful, and was carried out with the primary 
purpose of profit and not with the desire to harm the children who worked on these 
farms under conditions of slavery.288  Thus, in Nestle, just as in Talisman,289 the aim 
pursued by the corporation was that of enhancing its profits, even if that meant 
assisting the commission of gross human rights violations.  The court nevertheless 
 
 282.   Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, para. 44. 
 283.   Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 766–67 (9th Cir. 2011) (Schroeder, J., plurality opinion), 
vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013); In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1349 (S.D. Fla. 
2011). 
 284.   See discussion supra Part I.B.6. 
 285.   See, e.g., Talisman, 582 F.3d at 262 (finding that because there were “benign and constructive 
purposes” for the projects, there was no purpose to commit human rights violations). 
 286.   Id. at 264; see also Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 276 n.11 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(Katzmann, J., concurring) (noting that the intent to purposefully facilitate illegal activities “could be 
inferred” under certain circumstances). 
 287.   See Cassel, supra note 13, at 312 (arguing for an interpretation of the purpose test that allows 
purpose to be inferred from knowledge). 
 288.   Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1024–26 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 289.   Talisman, 582 F.3d at 262. 
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distinguished Talisman on the basis that in Nestle, the corporation allegedly directly 
benefited from the violations, i.e., child slave labor, as it lowered its production costs 
and raised its profits.290  In Talisman, on the other hand, the corporation did not 
receive such benefits, according to the court in Nestle.291 
However, Talisman clearly benefited from the military protecting its 
investment.292  Whether or not it benefited from the human rights violations carried 
out in order to provide this protection might depend on whether it would have been 
possible in the specific context of this investment in a conflict zone for the military to 
provide Talisman with the protection in a lawful way.  More importantly, however, 
the court in Talisman made very clear that in cases of otherwise legitimate 
commercial transactions the mens rea of purpose was only met when the corporation 
desired the human rights violations to take place.293  This is difficult to reconcile with 
the finding in Nestle that the defendants purposefully supported child slavery,294 even 
though they “did not have the subjective motive to harm children.”295  These 
inconsistencies could have been avoided had the court in Nestle applied a knowledge 
standard of mens rea, instead of leaving this question open.  Alternatively, the court 
could have clarified that purpose can, in fact, be inferred from the knowing provision 
of assistance without any need to show a primary purpose in the form of a desire to 
assist with bringing about the violations.  This would, however, have required the 
court to deviate from the purpose standard in the form of motive adopted in 
Talisman. 
The inconsistencies in the application of the purpose standard are also evident 
when comparing the Chiquita and Kiobel cases.  In Chiquita, the court seems to infer 
a desire to bring about the violations from the illegitimacy of the underlying 
activities, even though it specifically states that the corporation was primarily 
pursuing its business interests and driven by profit.296  It might be easy to deduce 
knowledge in such a case, but to infer a purpose directed at the commission of 
human rights violations in Chiquita seems as fictitious as to deny the presence of 
such a purpose in Kiobel where Shell, in pursuit of its business interests, knowingly 
facilitated them.297  It is in most cases simply not possible to know what, beyond 
furthering its business interests, motivated the corporate activities.  A mens rea 
standard in which knowledge serves as the basis on which to determine the 
individual’s state of mind might then “lead to a more objectified interpretation of the 
factual findings”298 than a standard that requires inferences regarding the accessory’s 
primary, secondary, exclusive, or other purposes that motivated the act of 
participation.  Moreover, “[t]he distinction of an aim pursued and a known 
 
 290.   Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1024. 
 291.   Id. 
 292.   See Talisman, 582 F.3d at 261–63 (explaining the allegations that Talisman was assisting the 
government, and, in turn, was benefitting from the government’s creation of a “buffer zone” around the 
Talisman oil fields by “displacing huge numbers of civilians,” allowing Talisman to operate). 
 293.   Id. at 263–64. 
 294.   Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1025–26. 
 295.   Id. at 1025. 
 296.   In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1349 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
 297.   Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 193 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
 298.   Hans Vest, A Structure-Based Concept of Genocidal Intent, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 781, 795–96 
(2007). 
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consequence conclusively connected with such aim is not basic enough to justify a 
different legal result:  both cases should be handled equally.”299 
This brings into focus another problem of the purpose approach.  Given that 
those courts that applied a purpose test under the ATS tended to bypass any actus 
reus analysis, the motive with which the act of assistance was carried out becomes the 
main point of reference for distinguishing between the acceptable and the unlawful.  
However, this is unsatisfactory, as it is doubtful that the motive behind the act of 
assistance can be determined with sufficient certainty to provide a reliable criterion 
for delineating complicity liability. 
This concern is echoed in domestic criminal law cases.  In this context, courts 
also attach significance to the nature of the assistance and are more easily prepared 
to infer intent where the goods were inherently harmful, their sale or resale 
restricted, or the transactions themselves dubious.300  The nature of the assistance 
thus influences the amount of evidence needed to establish knowledge and intent.301  
Nevertheless, some courts expressed doubts that the criteria to determine the 
circumstances in which an inference of intent to join was permissible were delineated 
clearly enough.302  In order to overcome this and other problems with the mens rea 
test of purpose, such as impunity in cases of assisting serious offenses303 or dangerous 
acts,304 some courts introduced a substantiality element for the act of assistance and 
suggested that “where the evidence of the defendant’s intent must be inferred from 
the aid given,” a case might be made to modify the analysis by focusing instead “on 
the amount of assistance knowingly given.”305  Indeed, it was pointed out that 
“[m]aterial assistance deliberately given is itself evidence of intent.”306  Most courts 
use this approach for determining the mens rea, rather than for an actus reus 
analysis, and infer both knowledge and intent from the substantial nature of the 
assistance, while rejecting such an inference where the assistance is trivial.307  Thus, 
while courts in the ATS context refused to infer intent based on the substantial 
nature of the assistance in cases of ordinary commercial transactions, in domestic 
cases courts felt that it was justified to make such an inference. 
 
 299.   Id. at 789 (emphasis omitted). 
 300.   See Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711–12 (1943) (describing factors taken into 
account to determine sellers’ knowledge of whether goods will be used unlawfully). 
 301.   Id. 
 302.   United States v. Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283, 286 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 303.   United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 798 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 304.   See United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 887–88 (7th Cir. 1991) (dictum) (“It might be better in 
evaluating charges of aiding and abetting to jettison talk of desire and focus on the real concern, which is 
the relative dangerousness of different types of assistance . . . .”). 
 305.   United States v. Irwin, 149 F.3d 565, 572 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 306.   Id. (emphasis omitted).  See also Tenore v. Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. of N.Y., 256 F.2d 791, 794–95 
(7th Cir. 1958) (discussing intent in the context of insurance and stating that “[i]f a false statement is 
knowingly made by the insured with regard to a material matter, the intent to defraud will be inferred”). 
 307.   See, e.g., Fountain, 768 F.2d at 798 (comparing the more trivial act of assisting prostitution 
through supplying a dress and the more serious act of assisting murder by providing the murder weapon in 
conducting mens rea analysis). 
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2. Analysis of the Reasons for Adopting a Purpose Test in U.S. Criminal 
Law 
Courts have adopted a mens rea standard of purpose in the domestic context as 
a reaction to the lack of a substantiality or materiality requirement at the actus reus 
level;308 the mens rea standard ensures that not every sale of a lawful good to another 
person can result in complicity liability if the buyer then uses it for unlawful 
purposes.  The main reason behind promoting a mens rea standard of purpose seems 
to be “to promote autonomy by precluding criminal impediments to otherwise lawful 
activities that depend on social interaction, especially business.”309 
The question, nevertheless, is whether the balance between not inhibiting lawful 
activities and deterring crime is best achieved by imposing a mens rea test of 
purpose, as it is doubtful that the test really delivers what it seems to promise.  
Indeed, in the domestic cases discussed in this Article, it is difficult to see why, as the 
courts assume, the prevention of activities is better achieved by imposing a mens rea 
test of desire than one of knowledge.310  It might well be right that not much would be 
gained by imposing liability in the prostitution cases, while it would be justified to 
hold the seller of the gun liable.  The effect of selling a dress or an address book to a 
prostitute on the commission of the crime of prostitution is in all likelihood minor, 
whereas the sale of a gun that is used for murder has a much more profound impact 
on the commission of the principal offense.  However, the difference between the 
two cases seems to lie at the actus reus and not the mens rea level.  In one case, the 
assistance is crucial for committing the crime; in the other its potential to further the 
crime is so minimal that it is difficult to establish a link between the crime and the 
assistance. 
Whether or not the different nature of the assistance in the two cases might also 
impact the possibility of inferring intent to further the crime seems much less 
relevant.  Indeed, given the courts’ focus on deterrence in these cases, it is not 
obvious what, exactly, would be gained by criminalizing the sale of the dress even if 
the seller acted with the purpose to assist with prostitution, unless, exceptionally, the 
dress was a significant factor in facilitating the crime.  The furtherance of prostitution 
would not be any greater if the seller acted with the relevant purpose.  Similarly, 
regarding Judge Leval’s example in Kiobel of Hitler’s shoemaker,311 he could be an 
aider and abettor of Hitler’s crimes if he expressed his desire that the shoes assist 
him with his crimes.  However, little would be achieved if liability depended 
decisively on the shoemaker’s motives, as it is rather unlikely that the shoes will have 
had any effect on the crimes committed.312 
 
 308.   Weiss, supra note 200, at 1483 (using the “bad purpose and purposeful intent approaches 
protect[s] the marginally involved participant”). 
 309.   James G. Stewart, The End of “Modes of Liability” for International Crimes, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L 
L. 165, 191 (2012). 
 310.   See Weiss, supra note 200, at 1484 (asserting the superiority of the knowledge test for deterrence 
purposes). 
 311.   Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 158 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
 312.   See Sykes, supra note 8, at 2203 (“Instead, civil aiding and abetting liability is most likely to be 
useful when it penalizes actors who have a meaningful capacity to exert control or impose restraint on the 
primary wrongdoer.”). 
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In the U.S. criminal case of Zafiro, the court appreciated this and opined that 
“[i]t might be better in evaluating charges of aiding and abetting to jettison talk of 
desire and focus on the real concern, which is the relative dangerousness of different 
types of assistance . . . .”313  What would matter then is no longer the desire of the 
accomplice to further the principal offense, but rather whether the assistance is 
sufficiently essential to impose complicity liability and whether the accomplice knew 
this.  The liability test would thus be transformed to a test of providing knowing 
assistance of more than a trivial nature.  Hanauer v. Doane nicely expressed some 
other reasons in support of a knowledge test for mens rea: 
Can a man furnish another with the means of committing murder, or any 
abominable crime, knowing that the purchaser procures them, and intends 
to use them, for that purpose, and then pretend that he is not a participator 
in the guilt? . . .  [No, h]e cannot be permitted to stand on the nice 
metaphysical distinction that, although he knows that the purchaser buys 
the goods for the purpose of aiding the rebellion, he does not sell them for 
that purpose.314 
Since Hanauer v. Doane was decided, the knowledge standard has clearly lost 
traction with U.S. courts, but this analysis of the criminal cases has shown that courts 
often do, in fact, apply a substantial assistance plus knowledge test, even though they 
claim to insist on purpose as the necessary mens rea standard. 
3. Analysis of the Reasons for Adopting a Purpose Standard in 
Corporate Complicity Cases 
In the context of corporate liability under the ATS, where the actus reus 
requires an act of assistance that has a substantial effect on the commission of the 
violation of the law of nations, the adoption of the purpose test reflects the view that 
legitimate commercial transactions are only transformed into blameworthy acts of 
complicity where the abuses were desired by the corporation and the facial 
harmlessness of the act is counterbalanced by a particularly reprehensible state of 
mind.  The approach to the mens rea test both in Talisman and in Judge Leval’s 
concurring opinion in Kiobel was at least partly motivated by the concern that 
without a strict mens rea standard of purpose liability would stretch too far, 
expressing a clear distrust in the possibility of limiting liability sensibly at the actus 
reus level in cases of commercial transactions.  The purpose test might then be 
regarded as an appropriate tool to limit liability if the claims are perceived as 
unjustified interference in legitimate business decisions.  In this vein, courts have 
expressed concerns that litigation would allow “private parties to impose embargos 
or international sanctions through civil actions in United States courts,”315 and 
dissuade companies from carrying out business with regimes that have “less than 
stellar human rights records.”316 
 
 313.   United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 887–88 (7th Cir. 1991) (dictum). 
 314.   Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. 342, 347 (1870).  But see Weiss, supra note 200, at 1367 (noting that 
the knowledge standard was disfavored by subsequent U.S. case law). 
 315.   Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 264 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 316.   In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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Thus, two interrelated reasons seem to lie behind the adoption of a purpose 
approach: the fear that in the context of commercial activities, the actus reus test is 
not capable of separating mere commercial transactions with bad actors from those 
that are worthy of creating complicity liability, and, relatedly, the perception that 
business transactions with bad actors are legitimate, even where they assist that actor 
with gross human rights violations, as long as this result was not the primary motive 
behind the corporate act. 
However, to concentrate on the legitimacy of the underlying action or its 
commercial nature is unhelpful and misleading.  Aiding and abetting liability does 
not require that the act of assistance consist of an activity that is illegitimate in and of 
itself, regardless of the circumstances of the individual case.317  What makes a 
commercial act illegitimate—and gives rise to the imposition of complicity liability—
is that in a specific case an act that might under other circumstances be perfectly 
legitimate assist with carrying out a crime or gross human rights violation and thus 
meet the actus reus requirements of complicity liability.  In the context of the ATS 
cases, this means that it amounted to practical assistance that had a substantial effect 
on the commission of gross human rights violations. 
While doing business with a State that commits gross human rights violations 
does not in itself give rise to liability,318 this is not what the cases against corporations 
for aiding and abetting are about.  In all cases, with more or less detail and different 
degrees of plausibility, the plaintiffs alleged that certain acts of the defendant 
corporations had a substantial effect on the commission of gross human rights 
violations carried out by the governments with which they were doing business.  
Where the allegations do not meet this standard and simply consist of asserting 
business transactions between the corporation and the violating state, the claims can 
be thrown out because of the lack of an actus reus.  However, where such an effect 
can be shown, the act turns from a lawful, harmless, and legitimate activity to an act 
of aiding and abetting gross human rights violations. 
If it is recognized that, at the objective level, the line of acceptable business 
practices is crossed where substantial assistance with gross human rights violations is 
rendered, then the issue to be addressed at the mens rea level is not that of how to 
shield corporations from liability for carrying out legitimate business with states with 
dubious human rights records.  Instead, the question turns into whether liability is 
only justified if such acts are committed with an exceptionally guilty mind in the form 
of primary purpose, or whether it is already warranted where the corporation knew 
of the effect its commercial activities would have on human rights violations.  
Consequently, the choice of the mens rea standard of purpose reflects the view that it 
is acceptable that corporations pursue their business interests by knowingly 
facilitating gross human rights abuses, and in some cases even relying on them for 
their safety and protection, as long as they do not actively desire or procure them.  
The perception of commercial transactions as legitimate, even where they have a 
 
 317.   See Stewart (2013(2)), supra note 171 (“There is nothing inherently illegal in driving a car away 
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 318.   In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Mastafa v. Australian 
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substantial effect on the commission of human rights violations, is thus clearly an 
important reason behind courts’ desire to limit liability. 
In the academic discussion, this issue is sometimes linked to the question of the 
potential virtue of foreign investment even in the most abusive contexts, clearly a 
divisive issue.319  Without engaging with this discussion in detail, it should be noted 
that corporations are free to do business and engage constructively with regimes that 
commit gross human rights violations on a large scale, as long as they avoid any 
complicity in these violations.320  The aim of complicity liability is not to proscribe all 
business with certain regimes, but rather to discourage the corporate furtherance of 
the human rights violations they commit.321  This does not conflict with constructive 
engagement, as there is nothing constructive about complicity in human rights 
violations.  Conversely, constructive engagement does not give corporations a blank 
check to be complicit in gross human rights violations carried out by regimes with 
which they are engaging.322  Indeed, as Judge Hall rightly suggested in his concurring 
opinion in Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank, Ltd., “business imperatives [do not] 
require a license to assist in violations of international law.”323 
Contrary to the message that the adoption of the purpose test conveys, to 
knowingly assist in the commission of gross human rights violations is not an 
acceptable business practice,324 and victims of such practices should not have to 
endure their consequences without the possibility of obtaining an effective remedy.  
The Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights issued by the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises,325 which were endorsed by 
the U.N. Human Rights Council, reinforce this in the specific context of human 
rights responsibilities of corporations.326  According to Guiding Principle 11, 
corporations have the responsibility to respect human rights, which “means that they 
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(“Without the threat of liability, companies face no consequences for being complicit in the very abuses 
that constructive engagement is designed to prevent.”). 
 322.   Id. at 222; see also Jacek, supra note 320, at 312–14 (allowing a knowledge requirement “create[s] 
an incentive for corporations to implement internal compliance structures within the corporation to 
prevent and limit liability”); Michalowski, No Complicity Liability, supra note 98, at 521–22 
(“[C]onstructive engagement cannot give corporations a blank check to be complicit in gross human rights 
violations carried out by regimes with which they are engaging.”). 
 323.   Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 289 (2d Cir. 2007) (Hall, J., concurring). 
 324.   See, e.g., id. at 289 (dismissing the idea that “business imperatives require a license to assist in 
violations of international law”); Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, paras. 238, 
245 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) (following the holding of the Zyklon B 
Case); The Zyklon B Case, 1 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93, 94, 102 (1947) (finding 
that the knowing provision of the poison gas to those committing gross human rights violations subjects 
the defendants to liability).  See also the discussion supra in Part IV.A. 
 325.   Ruggie, Guiding Principles, supra note 1, cmt. to principle 17. 
 326.   See generally id. 
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should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse 
human rights impacts with which they are involved.”327  This responsibility includes 
the avoidance of complicity in human rights violations carried out by their business 
partners.328  The Guiding Principles impose on corporations the responsibility to 
carry out human rights due diligence in order to become aware of the human rights 
impacts of their business operations (Guiding Principle 17), including the risk of 
complicity.329  Due diligence requires proactive behavior to “become aware of, 
prevent and address adverse human rights impacts.”330  These responsibilities thus go 
even further than the knowledge standard, as corporations cannot hide behind their 
ignorance.331  While not legally binding on the corporations, the Guiding Principles 
are widely recognized332 and show that knowing complicity in human rights violations 
is not regarded as an acceptable and legitimate business practice and that victims of 
such practices should not be left without a remedy.333 
Judge Leval forcefully criticized the majority in Kiobel, which squarely rejected 
civil liability of corporations under the ATS, on the grounds that such a rule has the 
effect “to immunize the profits earned from the most heinous acts known to 
mankind” and “operates to the detriment of the objective of international law to 
protect fundamental human rights.”334  However, the application of the purpose test 
has a similar effect when it provides impunity to corporations that knowingly 
facilitated gross human rights violations for the purpose of profit maximization.  
Indeed, it regards the pursuance of commercial interests as legitimate even where it 
furthers gross violations of the human rights of others, as long as the corporation is 
simply indifferent to them or might prefer that they do not occur.335  Given that this 
will be the situation in the vast majority of corporate complicity cases, Chief Justice 
Jacobs might well have been right when commenting in the Kiobel decision denying 
an en banc rehearing of the Second Circuit’s decision that, if the relevant mens rea 
test is one of purpose, the question of whether or not the ATS provides for a remedy 
in cases of corporate complicity “is one of no big consequence”336  as this excludes the 
possibility of successfully arguing a case of corporate liability under the ATS so 
effectively that “[t]he incremental number of cases actually foreclosed by the 
majority opinion in Kiobel approaches the vanishing point.”337  As a consequence, 
under the purpose test, there is no incentive for corporations to refrain from 
knowingly aiding and abetting abuses where to do so would be beneficial for 
business.  Instead, individuals and corporations will be isolated from the known and 
 
 327.   Id. principle 11. 
 328.   Id. principle 17 & cmt.  See also Ruggie, Clarifying the Concepts, supra note 1, paras. 26, 71 
(stating that corporations should practice due diligence  to avoid complicity in human rights violations). 
 329.   Ruggie, Guiding Principles, supra note 1, cmt. to principle 17. 
 330.   Ruggie, Clarifying the Concepts, supra note 1, para. 23. 
 331.   For a discussion see, e.g., Radu Mares, Defining the Limits of Corporate Responsibilities Against 
the Concept of Legal Positive Obligations, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1157, 1205–06 (2009). 
 332.   Id. at 1165 n.26. 
 333.   Ruggie, Guiding Principles, supra note 1, principle 22 & cmt. (suggesting in this respect that 
“[w]here business enterprises identify that they have caused or contributed to adverse impacts, they 
should provide for or cooperate in their remediation through legitimate processes”). 
 334.   Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 159 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
 335.   Michalowski, The Mens Rea Standard, supra note 13, at 272. 
 336.   Id. at 240 (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 642 F.3d 268, 270 (2d Circ 2011)). 
 337.   Id. (quoting Kiobel, 642 F.3d at 271). 
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foreseen consequences of their actions as long as they are indifferent to their 
occurrence and motivated by business or other interests. 
The latter is, of course, precisely what proponents of the purpose/specific 
direction approach want to achieve.  In support of the approach in Perišić, for 
example, Professor Kevin Jon Heller has commented that otherwise, if 
individuals who interact with organizations engaged in both lawful and 
unlawful acts . . . are aware of the unlawful acts, they cannot provide the 
organization with any assistance that might end up facilitating them — 
even if they do not intend to facilitate those acts, and even if they do 
everything in their power to prevent their facilitation.338 
Similar issues could arise in the case of corporations that provide regimes that 
have very bad human rights records with goods or services that can be used to 
commit human rights violations.  The above statement is, nevertheless, not entirely 
true, unless the applicable liability standard is that of knowing provision of any form 
of assistance, which is neither the case in international criminal law nor under the 
ATS.  In both cases, the actus reus requires the provision of assistance that has a 
substantial effect on the commission of the principal offense.  Nevertheless, Heller 
tries to show the, in his view, untenable consequences of a liability standard of 
knowing substantial assistance by citing the example of providing weapons to rebels 
in Syria who lawfully fight against the Assad regime, despite widespread knowledge 
that these rebel groups commit war crimes and crimes against humanity.339  In his 
view, governments and organizations that provide weapons in these circumstances 
would incur aiding and abetting liability “[u]nless . . . the actus reus of aiding and 
abetting requires proof that the defendant specifically directed his assistance to an 
organization’s unlawful acts.”340  With a specific direction requirement—or, 
presumably, a mens rea test of purpose—in place, “as long as the British government 
and the CIA do everything they can to ensure that their provision of weapons 
facilitate only lawful rebel actions, they cannot be held legally responsible for any 
international crimes committed, despite their best efforts, with those weapons.”341 
A finding that the assistor did everything possible “to ensure that their 
provision of weapons facilitate only lawful rebel actions” would clearly go a long way 
to show that there was no specific direction to assist the unlawful use.342  However, 
the specific direction requirement isolates the assistor from the unlawful acts and 
their consequences, as long as a reasonable conclusion that the assistance was 
provided for lawful purposes is possible, regardless of the presence or absence of 
attempts to ensure that the assistance provided will only be put to a lawful use.  Just 
like a purpose test of mens rea, it thus allows the individual or corporation providing 
assistance to evade liability as long as they can show that they did not, in fact, intend 
the logical consequences of their acts to come about.  As Judge Liu emphasizes in his 
forceful partial dissent in Perišić, the adoption of the specific direction requirement 
 
 338.   Heller, supra note 171. 
 339.   Id. 
 340.   Id. 
 341.   Id. 
 342.   Id. 
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“risks undermining the very purpose of aiding and abetting liability by allowing those 
responsible for knowingly facilitating the most grievous crimes to evade 
responsibility for their acts.”343 
The Zyklon B case in which industrialists were accused of supplying the Nazis 
with large quantities of the poison gas Zyklon B that was used for the mass killings of 
concentration camp victims—but also had lawful uses—provides a good example for 
demonstrating the unacceptable consequences of applying a purpose test.344  As 
industrialists, the defendants’ primary purpose was presumably to make a profit with 
the gas they sold to the Nazi regime.  Indeed, the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. 
Furundzija stressed that “their purpose was to sell insecticide to the SS (for profit, 
that is a lawful goal pursued by lawful means).”345  However, the lawfulness of the 
underlying transactions was regarded as irrelevant when determining the defendants’ 
culpability, and rightly so.346  It would be difficult to justify holding them accountable 
for the atrocities they knowingly facilitated in pursuance of their business interests 
only if they desired the killings to take place, while indifference to the effects of their 
actions, or even repugnance, should exonerate them, if they nevertheless knowingly 
provided the gas.347 
As this analysis has shown, the purpose test of mens rea faces many objections, 
spanning from the need to infer purpose in most cases from knowledge, to the 
undesirable consequences of a test that regards as legitimate the knowing provision 
of substantial assistance to further crimes or human rights violations, as long as the 
main objective of the act is business oriented. 
CONCLUSION FOR DEVELOPING CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING 
CORPORATE COMPLICITY LIABILITY 
This Article has shown that the commercial and routine nature of an activity 
does not preclude complicity liability.  The question is rather under what 
circumstances, and according to which criteria, complicity liability can be triggered in 
the context of commercial activities.  In particular, does the commercial context 
require or at least justify applying separate, more restrictive liability criteria than 
those used to determine complicity liability outside of this specific context? 
In the ATS cases, many courts answered that question in the affirmative and 
roughly distinguished two situations:  (1) corporate acts that are facially lawful and 
consist of commercial transactions, such as the sale of goods or provision of services 
 
 343.   Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Appeals Judgement, para. 3 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013) (Liu, J., dissenting in part). 
 344.   The Zyklon B Case, 1 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93, 94 (1947), 
 345.   Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, para. 238 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998). 
 346.   See The Zyklon B Case, 1 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93, 102 (sentencing 
defendants to death for sale of insecticide to the SS, presumably based on their knowledge that it would be 
used to kill human beings). 
 347.   See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank, 504 F.3d 254, 290 (2d Cir. 2007) (Hall, J., concurring) 
(“The Zyklon B Case provides a clear example of when liability would attach . . . when a defendant 
provides ‘the tools, instrumentalities, or services to commit [human rights] violations with actual . . . 
knowledge that those tools, instrumentalities or services will be (or only could be) used in connection with 
that purpose.’” (citation omitted)). 
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that are used by a third party to commit human rights violations; and (2) corporate 
behavior that is itself unlawful and clearly falls outside of legitimate business 
transactions, such as incitement to commit crimes or human rights violations, or 
paying paramilitary or terrorist groups to protect corporate investments.  In the first 
scenario, liability was only found if either the assistance was inherently harmful or 
provided the direct means for carrying out the violations, or where the defendant 
acted with the direct purpose of assisting their commission.  In the second type of 
cases, the courts easily find the line between legitimate commercial activities and 
those that trigger corporate complicity to be crossed, as the unlawfulness of the 
corporate activity will in most cases mean that it cannot be associated with ordinary 
commercial dealings. 
However, as argued in Part IV, even where it can be easily and 
uncontroversially determined that the act of assistance was unlawful or exceeded the 
commercially acceptable, liability should still require establishing a link between the 
act and the violations, and it is still necessary to establish the relevant mens rea.348  At 
the same time, aiding and abetting liability does not require that the act of assistance 
be unlawful on its face.  Indeed, “acts which in themselves may be benign, if done for 
a benign purpose, may be actionable if done with the knowledge that they are 
supporting unlawful acts.”349  This is why someone who drives the getaway car after a 
bank robbery can be held liable as an accomplice, even though the act of driving is 
clearly, in principle, lawful.  Basing the determination of the liability standards in 
corporate complicity cases on the lawful, ordinary, or routine nature of the act of 
assistance is therefore flawed. 
Instead of applying the existing liability standards to determine the lawfulness 
of the underlying act in the circumstances of each case (which is how complicity cases 
are dealt with outside of the commercial context), it seems that the courts have 
approached the question the wrong way and allowed the definition of liability to be 
guided by the perceived legitimacy of the commercially motivated act of assistance 
and adapted the applicable liability standards in light of this.  This is not to suggest 
that liability standards can or should be determined in isolation from the reality of, 
and the policy considerations applicable in, any given situation.  Nevertheless, if the 
commercial nature of an act that otherwise meets the criteria of complicity liability is 
the primary reason to adapt and lower liability standards—which in many cases 
might result in exempting corporate actors from liability—this would require a 
justification that goes beyond the mere fact of the commercial nature or motivation 
of the act.  As this Article has demonstrated, none of the explanations that have been 
advanced satisfactorily substantiates such a claim. 
It does not follow, however, that the commercial nature of the act of assistance 
might not be of relevance when determining complicity liability.  While not 
determinative, whether or not the act of assistance consisted of the provision of 
routine and lawful commercial services, and whether the goods and services provided 
were neutral or inherently harmful, might influence the depth of the analysis that is 
 
 348.   See supra Part IV. 
 349.   Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).  See also Linde v. Arab 
Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 588 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that “given plaintiffs’ allegations regarding 
the knowing and intentional nature of the Bank’s activities, there is nothing ‘routine’ about the services 
the Bank is alleged to provide”). 
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL  Volume 50, Issue 3 
460 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 50:3 
required in each case, both at the actus reus and the mens rea level.  One might even 
reverse the burden of proof where the act of assistance consists of the provision of an 
inherently harmful product or service or the act of assistance is itself unlawful, to 
reflect the likelihood that the act of assistance will have a significant effect on the 
business partners’ commission of gross human rights violations, and the likelihood 
that the corporation knows this.350  Such a reversal of the burden of proof would need 
to be rebuttable and open to showing that, in the individual case, the provision of a 
harmful product did not have a substantial effect on the commission of the crime, or 
that despite its harmful nature and significant effect, the corporate actor did not have 
the relevant knowledge to justify the imposition of complicity liability.  It would not 
therefore make a case-by-case analysis obsolete, but rather shift the starting point of 
the analysis to a presumption in favor of liability in these scenarios. 
For the case-by-case analysis, at the actus reus level, it is primarily the nature of 
the assistance that is of relevance.  It might be easier to establish that the provision of 
inherently harmful goods or services such as the supply of weapons has a substantial 
effect on the commission of human rights violations such as extrajudicial killings than 
where money is provided that is used to buy the weapons.  However, not every gun 
sold facilitates an unlawful killing, while money might be lent for the purpose of 
buying weapons to carry out extrajudicial killings.  Thus, all depends on the 
circumstances of each case, and a thorough analysis is necessary in all situations, 
even though its intensity might differ depending on the nature of the act of 
assistance. 
Such a case-by-case analysis clearly creates some uncertainty and room for 
different assessments of individual cases.  Some criteria to make such evaluation of 
the effect of an act of assistance on the commission of human rights abuses, and the 
substantiality of this effect, more predictable are:  the closeness of the accomplice to 
the commission of the offense; the quality and quantity of the assistance provided; 
whether the assistance provided the direct means with which the violations were 
carried out; whether the assistance was provided in the context of a continuing 
relationship or a one-off transaction or given in the context of systemic rather than 
isolated violations, to name but a few.  Nevertheless, as the discussion of Taylor and 
some of the U.S. criminal cases has shown, such a check list, however comprehensive, 
can achieve no more than provide points to consider as part of a detailed analysis of 
the specific circumstances of each case.  This, however, is not unusual in law, and 
courts are used to carrying out such analyses in both criminal and civil cases, based 
on general liability standards such as substantial effect.351  Corporations are equally 
capable, and under the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights are 
expected,352 to carry out complicity risk assessments in the context of their 
commercial relationships. 
 
 350.   For a comparable argument for cases in which the business partner has a particularly bad human 
rights record, see Michalowski, No Complicity Liability, supra note 98, at 520 (“Where a regime is widely 
known to commit gross human rights violations . . . it could be argued that lenders have a heightened due 
diligence obligation to inquire into the use of money they are lending with respect to the violations taking 
place.”). 
 351.   See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (determining whether a regulated activity had a 
“substantial effect” on interstate commerce such that it could be federally criminalized); Nat’l Fed’n of 
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585 (2012) (considering whether the failure to have health 
insurance has a “substantial and deleterious effect on interstate commerce”). 
 352.   Ruggie, Guiding Principles, supra note 1, principle 17 & cmt. 
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If a thorough actus reus analysis were carried out even in cases in which the 
alleged assistance consisted of a commercial transaction, aiding and abetting liability 
would have two filters, one with regard to the act of assistance itself, another 
concerning the mental state.  As particularly the discussion of the prostitution 
examples in U.S. criminal cases demonstrated, many cases could already be thrown 
out at the actus reus level, based on the immateriality of the assistance provided.  
Equally, in the In re South African Apartheid Litigation case, the provision of 
computers to prison authorities might not have had a sufficiently close link to 
instances of torture to justify a finding that the actus reus of complicity liability is 
met, unless, based on specific facts in an individual case, such a link can exceptionally 
be shown.  A case-by-case approach to determining the substantial effect of the 
assistance, coupled with a knowledge test of mens rea, thus does not create limitless 
corporate complicity liability, as is often alleged.353 
To address Judge Leval’s concern that unless a mens rea test of purpose is 
applied, Hitler’s shoemaker, for example, might be liable for aiding and abetting the 
atrocious crimes committed by Hitler,354 it seems that the shoemaker’s liability can be 
much more appropriately excluded at the actus reus than at the mens rea level.  It is 
rather unlikely that the shoes Hitler was wearing had a substantial effect on the 
crimes he carried out.  The shoemaker then cannot be held liable as an accessory to 
Hitler’s crimes, whatever the motives for providing Hitler with shoes.  If, however, as 
Judge Leval suggests, liability depended decisively on the shoemaker’s reasons for 
providing the shoes,355 he or she could be an aider and abettor of Hitler’s crime when 
making the shoes with the desire that they should assist him with his crimes.  This is 
another demonstration of the fact that even in cases of commercial transactions, the 
objective and subjective elements of aiding and abetting liability serve different 
functions, and insubstantial assistance or acts that are too remote to have had a 
substantial effect on the violations can and should be filtered out at the actus reus 
level of liability. 
At the mens rea level, the commercial nature of the assistance is also potentially 
highly relevant.  It will often be easier to infer knowledge of the business partner’s 
unlawful use of the goods or services provided where a transaction already on its face 
goes beyond accepted commercial practice, or involves dealing with goods that are 
particularly prone to unlawful use.  Routine commercial transactions, on the other 
hand, might raise less ground for suspicion with regard to their harmful effects.  
However, the commercial character of the transaction is not a reason to exclude 
liability where knowledge can nevertheless be shown, nor does the inherently 
harmful character of the goods or services automatically give rise to an inference of 
knowledge with regard to their intended unlawful use.  Instead, a thorough analysis 
based on the facts and circumstances of each case has to be carried out to establish 
the relevant knowledge. 
 
 353.   See Mares, supra note 331, at 1206 (noting that “the threshold of knowledge [required for 
complicity] might not be very demanding to attract liability”). 
 354.   Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 158 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
 355.   Id. 
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Two Nuremberg cases, the Farben case356 and the Zyklon B case,357 provide a 
good demonstration of how this can work in practice.  In both cases industrialists 
were accused of supplying the Nazis with large quantities of the poison gas Zyklon B 
that was used for the mass killings of concentration camp members.  In the Farben 
case, the defendants were acquitted even though: 
The proof is quite convincing that large quantities of Cyclon-B were 
supplied to the SS by Degesch and that it was used in the mass 
extermination of inmates of concentration camps, including Auschwitz.  
But neither the volume of production nor the fact that large shipments 
were destined to concentration camps would alone be sufficient to lead us 
to conclude that those who knew of such facts must also have had 
knowledge of the criminal purposes to which this substance was being put.  
Any such conclusion is refuted by the well-known need for insecticides 
wherever large numbers of displaced persons, brought in from widely 
scattered regions, are confined in congested quarters lacking adequate 
sanitary facilities.358 
The tribunal relied heavily on testimony according to which the use of Zyklon B 
for the extermination of concentration camp inmates had been “Top Secret” and that 
none of “the defendants had any knowledge whatever that an improper use was 
being made.”359  In the Zyklon B case, on the other hand, the industrialists were 
convicted because there was witness testimony to the effect that one of the 
defendants knew of the criminal use made of the gas,360 and because the structure of 
the defendants’ enterprise made it implausible that they did not have the relevant 
knowledge.  This shows that even where harmful substances are sold to criminal 
regimes, inferences of knowledge with regard to their unlawful use are not 
automatic, but rather depend on an in-depth analysis of all the surrounding 
circumstances.  It can be assumed that the provision of the gas will have had a 
substantial effect on the commission of the killings, so that the actus reus will have 
been met in both cases.  Nevertheless, the mens rea in the form of knowledge 
provided a corrective according to which the two cases were distinguished. 
Just like the substantial effect requirement at the actus reus level, the mens rea 
standard of knowledge needs further clarification.  In this Article, the assumption, 
based on the case law discussed, has been that actual knowledge would be necessary, 
rather than a mere showing that the corporation should have known what effect its 
commercial transactions would have on the commission of human rights violations.361  
Actual knowledge can be proven if, based on all the circumstances of the case, a 
reasonable inference can be made that the corporation must have known the 
 
 356.   The Farben Case (I.G. Farben Case), 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1 (1952). 
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 360.   The Zyklon B Case, 1 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93, 95–96 (1947). 
 361.   But see Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 953 (9th Cir. 2002) (suggesting that the appropriate 
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relevant facts.362  This is different from the “should have known” standard which 
would be satisfied even if no showing or inference of existing knowledge can be 
made, but where the accomplice would have had the relevant knowledge had the 
diligence that could be expected from a reasonable person been exercised.363  In the 
context of corporate complicity in human rights violations, an argument can be made 
for imposing due diligence responsibilities which would require active inquiries into 
the use the business partner might make of goods or services provided.  The 
imposition of such duties might well raise the cost of business.  However, compliance 
with them has the benefit of reducing the risk of legal claims of corporate complicity 
“by showing that [the corporation] took every reasonable step to avoid involvement 
with an alleged human rights abuse,”364 as well as that of preventing the occurrence of 
human rights violations through illegitimate uses of corporate products and services.  
While currently not a legal requirement in most contexts, such due diligence 
responsibilities are postulated in the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights.365  However, their scope has so far not been outlined clearly.366 
Another mens rea related question that still needs refining is what, precisely, 
the accomplice needs to know to incur liability.367  It has been suggested that while 
the aider and abettor would not “necessarily have to know all factual (e.g., date, 
location, offender, victim) or normative (e.g., gravity) details of the principal 
crime . . . there should be a requirement that the accessory, at minimum, knows 
about the ‘offence’ that he facilitates.”368  The ad hoc international criminal tribunals, 
while requiring knowledge “that the acts performed by the aider and abettor assist 
[in] the commission of the specific crime of the principal,”369 nevertheless clarify that 
knowledge of “the precise crime that was intended and which in the event was 
committed” is not necessary.370  Rather, knowledge that “one of a number of crimes 
will probably be committed” is sufficient.371  Whether or not corporations acted with 
the necessary mens rea would then depend on whether they knew of the types of 
crimes to be committed, and of the effect of their assistance on these crimes. 
As the International Commission of Jurists explains, a corporation that knows 
“that the equipment the business is selling is likely to be used by a buyer for one of a 
number of crimes would not escape liability because there is uncertainty as to the 
exact crime intended.”372  In many of the corporate complicity cases such knowledge 
can be inferred either because the human rights violations committed by a regime 
are well-documented and generally known, or because they came to the knowledge 
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of the corporation in the context of its business relations, as was allegedly the case in 
Talisman373 and Kiobel.374 
To summarize the main findings of this Article, the line between merely doing 
business with a bad actor and acts that give rise to complicity liability is crossed when 
a corporate activity, whether or not of a routine commercial nature, has a substantial 
effect on the commission of human rights violations, and the corporation had the 
relevant knowledge.  Clearly, the application of such a test in practice, and how to 
clarify its criteria, depends on context.  However, clarity about the broad features of 
the test to be applied in order to determine the objective and mental elements of 
corporate complicity liability is an important step towards setting the framework that 
should guide the future debate on corporate complicity liability and corporate due 
diligence responsibilities.  Just as important is to challenge recent trends in the 
influential ATS jurisprudence that are based on mistaken assumptions and should 
not serve as a model for future developments. 
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